BSV blockchainBSV blockchain

BRC specifications index

Find a BRCBSV Request for Comments by number or title and open its abstract and specification. A BRC is a numbered specification for how wallets, apps and services on the BSV blockchain work together, such as BRC-100BSV Request for Comments 100, the standard wallet-to-application interface for the interface between an app and a wallet.

To open a BRC from its number, add the number to brc.dev/, for example brc.dev/100, which redirects to the specification on bsv.brc.dev.

Which BRCs apply today

bsv.brc.dev lists no status for a BRC. Some BRCs are followed today and others are older design work. To tell which, read the README of the category folder in the BRCs repository and the notes inside the specification. Where a newer BRC narrows, extends or authoritatively re-specifies behavior, implementers should follow the newer one.

BRCs by category

The categories and the order follow bsv.brc.dev, with the BRCs in number order. Open a row for the abstract and the link to the specification.

Apps

Schemas, templates and conventions for building BSV blockchain apps:

BRCTitle
BRC-102The deployment-info.json Specification

We define a comprehensive and authoritative specification of the deployment-info.json schema. It is intended to serve as a reference for developers building BSV blockchain applications that integrate with the LARS (Local Automated Runtime System) and CARS (Cloud Automated Runtime System) tooling and beyond. By following this specification, projects can ensure a standardized and interoperable structure that other tools and workflows can rely upon.

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BRC-122Auditable Real-time Inference Architecture (ARIA)

This document specifies the Auditable Real-time Inference Architecture (ARIA) protocol, a BSV application-layer standard for cryptographic accountability of AI inference systems operating in production. ARIA enables independent, post-hoc verification of which AI model produced which output at what time, without requiring access to the operator’s systems or trust in the operator’s claims.

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BRC-145Registry-Free Typed Content Anchor with On-Chain Code Provenance

This BRC specifies a registry-free typed content anchor: a deterministic scheme for committing to typed content with a single 32-byte anchor and no central registry. An anchor is SHA-256(INKAN_DOMAIN || u8(len(kind)) || kind || data): a fixed domain string separates these digests from every other SHA-256 usage, a one-byte length prefix makes the kind/data boundary unambiguous for all inputs, and the kind string is inside the digest so two anchors of different types never collide even when the underlying data is identical. Because the type is carried in the digest and the type namespace is content-derived, third parties assign their own kinds and tiers ([namespace:]name[@t1|t2|t3]) without asking anyone, and the same kind renders and verifies identically on every device, forever. Anchors serialize to self-identifying ik1 codes whose version prefix keeps the construction hash-agile. The same primitive produces software/build provenance: a 1-of-1 (1Sat) code-provenance ordinal carrying the seal of a released build’s anchor, which any client re-verifies against the build it is executing, published beside a per-adopter tamper fingerprint over the same bytes; signed statements are published as immutable on-chain data records. This BRC defines the anchor construction, the code format, the open kind system, the tamper fingerprint, and the on-chain provenance record, in enough detail for an independent second implementation to interoperate byte-for-byte.

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BRC-168Verifiable Time Allocation

This document specifies time allocation records: a per-week, chain-anchored commitment by a BRC-169 handle to how its holder spent the 168 hours of that week, together with a disclosure mechanism that reveals chosen hours to chosen handles and nothing to anybody else.

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BRC-170Locked Content Header (LCH): Licensed, Micropayment-Enabled Content

This document specifies the Locked Content Header (LCH), a BSV-native container and licensing protocol for encrypted digital content. An LCH package identifies encrypted bytes, their media type and encryption method, the original rights holders, one or more ways to acquire licensed use, and the evidence needed to enforce or later demonstrate the resulting agreement.

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BRC-190Access Gates for Metanet Rooms

This document describes access gates: conditions attached to a room, evaluated by a client against verifiable facts about a reader, that decide whether the room’s contents are rendered to them.

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BRC-192Application Output Knowledge and Source Adapters
BRC-198LCH Acquisition through Private Overlays and Listing Covenants
BRC-210Derived Collectibles

This document specifies scores: inscribed, immutable rules from which a collectible’s appearance is derived rather than stored, so that the same object is a different object at a different block height and in different hands.

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BRC-216Dead-Man Timed Reveal of a Sealed Secret

This BRC defines a dead-man switch: a way for an owner to seal a document so that it stays private while the owner is active and becomes public if the owner stops checking in. The owner encrypts the document under a data key, splits that key into n shares with a threshold m ([SSS]), and commits the shares in a Merkle tree whose root is root. The owner arms the switch on-chain by publishing the encrypted document, a set of k check-in outputs at addresses derived from one base key P, and one watched outpoint F. Each check-in output has a cutoff height; the owner stays alive by spending it before that height. If the owner misses a cutoff, the holders of the shares reconstruct the data key and publish a release: an output carrying one share, its Merkle path, and a sealed pointer to the document, under a 137-byte header that binds root to P with a signature only the owner could make. A reader that collects m releases reconstructs the data key, decrypts the document, and reads it. A single reserved marker makes releases discoverable, and a reader ranks them by the capital locked toward them, treated as advisory because the marker is permissionless. The disclosure is gated by the holders, not by any script: the firing rule, the quorum that decides a cutoff has passed, the authentication a reader performs, and the bounds on everything a reader parses from the chain are all specified here, because each is a place where a careless implementation discloses too early, fails to disclose at all, or trusts a value an attacker chose.

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BRC-218Chat-Native Command Grammar for the Metanet

This document specifies a slash-command grammar for conversational Metanet clients, and a global set of command verbs that MUST behave identically in every conforming client regardless of ecosystem.

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BRC-220NotaryHash: Privacy-Preserving Signed-Hash Notarization with SPV-Verifiable Certificates

This specification defines a transaction format and a self-contained certificate for anchoring a signed hash to the Bitcoin blockchain. A signer proves they signed a specific hash; the on-chain anchor fixes that proof in time at the block in which it is mined. The notarizing service never receives the original document and never handles any client private key. Certificates are independently verifiable, offline for the signature and proof integrity, and against block headers alone (SPV) for the anchor, with no dependency on the issuing service or any chain-indexing API.

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BRC-222Consent Envelope: Verifiable Multi-Party Document Signing with On-Chain Signing Order

This document specifies how several parties sign one or more documents, in a stated order, so that anybody later holding the signed file can establish who signed, in what order, under what authority and when. They can do so offline, with block headers and nothing else, and without the cooperation of the software or service that coordinated the signing. Four things follow from that, and an e-signature service whose evidence lives in its own database can offer none of them.

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BRC-224Block Media Format (BMF): Composable On-Chain Audio/Video

Block Media Format (BMF) is an open format for composable, on-chain-native audio/video. Instead of one monolithic encoded file, a “video” is expressed as a small timing manifest that references independently-owned media components, each of which can be minted once on-chain, provenanced, and reused many times. BMF defines two file types: .bmf (the manifest / “recipe”) and .bmc (a portable ZIP container bundling a .bmf with its media). BMF introduces no new codec, it carries standard WebP, FLAC and MP3 inside, and requires no IANA registration to use. It is the media-composition layer that sits above component-level token/provenance standards.

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BRC-227Frictionless On-Chain Onboarding via Pre-Funded Claimable Tokens

This BRC specifies a protocol for onboarding a person who has no wallet and no coins directly into ownership of a real on-chain asset, by clicking a link. A publisher pre-funds a batch of voucher outputs; each voucher becomes a claim link. A recipient claims by having the voucher fund an on-chain acquisition (e.g. a covenant-token mint under BRC-226) while a key they generate in the moment owns the result, payer and owner are decoupled. The voucher keys are deterministically derived from the publisher’s private key, so every issued link and every unclaimed voucher is recoverable from the publisher’s key alone, with no separate backup. The blockchain “cold-start” problem, you already need a wallet and coins to receive your first asset, dissolves: the gifter pays; the recipient just claims.

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BRC-300Sponsored Onboarding and Wallet Choice

This document specifies what happens when a person with no wallet arrives at a Metanet application and is invited to connect one.

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Wallet

Standards for controlling, interfacing with and extending wallets. BRC-100 is the main interface between an app and a wallet, and BRC-116 specifies the permission lifecycle for current wallets:

BRCTitle
BRC-1Transaction Creation

We define a concise, transport-independent method by which applications can request the creation of Bitcoin transactions. We specify the use of BRC-8 transaction envelopes, and provide an open-ended and extensible approach to output stipulation by the requesting application. We define the formats for request, response and error messages exchanged between application and wallet software.

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BRC-2Data Encryption and Decryption

We devise a method for applications to request the encryption and decryption of data. Specifically, we define a mechanism for data encryption within the BRC-42 key derivation system, utilizing the BRC-43 protocol and key ID scheme. During encryption, the sender derives their own child private key and the child public key of the recipient using the BRC-42 process, then computes an ECDH shared secret between the child keys which is used in symmetric encryption with AES-256-GCM. The initialization vector, together with the ciphertext, are sent to the recipient. During decryption, the recipient computes their own private key and the public key of the sender, and uses ECDH to compute the same shared secret. The key is then used together with the provided initialization vector to decrypt the ciphertext. When no counterparty exists, we stipulate substitution for the sender’s own public key in the child key derivation process.

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BRC-3Digital Signature Creation and Verification

We define a mechanism for requesting and receiving digital signatures over the abstract communications channel first described by BRC-1. We rely on the BRC-43 invoice numbering and permission scheme on top of BRC-42 for key derivation, enabling the creation of private digital signatures that can only be verified by the counterparty. A signer derives their own child private key and uses it to compute an ECDSA signature, which is then communicated to the verified, together with the signer’s identity key, the message, and the protocol ID and key ID used. The verifier uses this information to derive the corresponding child public key for the signer, which is then checked against the signature and message with ECDSA. Without the BRC-42 shared secret, no third parties can discover the correct child public key, making then unable to validate the signature.

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BRC-4Input Redemption

We define a mechanism by which BRC-1 applications can denote UTXOs to be unlocked and redeemed by wallets as part of new Bitcoin transactions. We extend the message format defined by BRC-1 with information about the inputs requested by the application, including all information needed for a wallet to check the veracity of any inputs being redeemed.

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BRC-5HTTP Wallet Communications Substrate

The Bitcoin Wallet HTTP Interface is a standard interface that enables applications to connect with Bitcoin wallets to facilitate certain functionality. The interface provides a unified way for applications to request the creation of a Bitcoin transaction, encryption, digital signature creation, and other features provided by the wallet. By standardizing the interface, applications can support multiple wallets and give the user greater control over their Bitcoin-related activities.

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BRC-6XDM Wallet Communications Substrate

Cross-document messaging enables web-based applications to communicate with one another in a secure manner, without allowing the two applications to manipulate each other’s DOM trees. It defines a mechanism by which messages can be sent and received, with browser-based attestation of the origin of each message. We define the framework and conventions for operating a BRC-56 wallet over XDM, enabling a parent page that runs a wallet to communicate with one or multiple child pages that run applications.

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BRC-7Window Wallet Communication Substrate

The Window Wallet Communication Substrate is a standardized interface that enables seamless integration between web applications and browser embedded Bitcoin wallets. It serves as a unified gateway for applications to access various wallet functionalities, including the creation of Bitcoin transactions, encryption, digital signature creation, and more. By establishing this standardized interface, applications gain the ability to support multiple wallet providers, enhancing flexibility and choice for users in managing their Bitcoin-related tasks. This interface empowers users with greater control and accessibility while maintaining compatibility across different applications and wallets.

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BRC-46Wallet Transaction Output Tracking (Output Baskets)

We define an extension to BRC-1 that enables a wallet to facilitate the tracking of specific application-defined transaction outputs within baskets. A new set of messages across the abstract messaging interface facilitates applications’ access to unspent outputs stored in these baskets, with a permission system similar to that described in BRC-43 employed to regulate access by applications. Spending an output stored in a basket removes it, while new outputs can be added by specifying their basket as part of BRC-1 transaction creation requests.

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BRC-50Submitting Received Payments to a Wallet

To ensure a seamless process for submitting payments to a wallet, there must be a standardized method by which this process takes place. Wallets that implement this standard will be able to support the direct submission of transactions from applications to a user’s wallet along with the associated SPV information as defined by BRC-9. The required message structure and fields are defined below in the Payment Submission Message section, and the expected response to provide is defined in the Payment Acknowledgment Message section. Wallets that choose to implement this specification will allow applications that facilitate the exchange of payments to be built in a way that is interoperable, extensible, and SPV compliant.

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BRC-53Certificate Creation and Revelation

We define methods for an application to request that a wallet create and prove BRC-52 identity certificates. We define a set of additional messages that extend the BRC-1 application-to-wallet messaging layer with this functionality. We specify the functionality to be performed by the wallet as part of these processes, including a standard methodology for wallets to contact identity certificate certifiers over HTTP and carry out the signing of these documents. To keep users in control over how their data is processed and used, we allow for the wallet to obtain user consent prior to carrying out these operations.

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BRC-56Unified Abstract Wallet-to-Application Messaging Layer

The importance of a standard interface by which Bitcoin applications can communicate with wallets and underlying infrastructure cannot be overstated. We propose an identity interface facilitating the creation of Bitcoin transactions, the use of user-held keys for encryption and digital signatures, and the employment of identity certificates to authenticate users with their counterparties. We set a baseline standard and create a versioning system that facilitates continued expansion and extensibility over time.

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BRC-65Transaction Labels and List Actions

BRC-65 extends the functionality of BRC-56 by introducing the ability to label Bitcoin transactions when they are created using the BRC-1 Transaction Creation Request. This extension allows applications to organize and categorize transactions for different purposes. BRC-65 also introduces the capability to list labeled transactions, providing applications with an easy way to retrieve specific sets of transactions based on their labels. This standardization improves interoperability between wallets and applications and enhances the user experience by enabling the display of transaction lists relevant to specific categories or actions.

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BRC-66Output Basket Removal and Certificate Deletion

This BRC extends BRC-56 by adding the ability to remove specific outputs from a basket and delete digital certificates that are no longer required. Applications can request that a wallet remove outputs from a basket by providing the transaction ID (txid) and the output index (vout) along with the name of the basket. Certificates can be deleted by specifying the certifier, serial number, and certificate type. The wallet will authenticate the request and remove the requested output from the basket or delete the specified certificate. If the request is denied or the output or certificate cannot be found, the wallet will respond with an error message.

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BRC-73Group Permissions for App Access

This specification defines the manifest declaration format for grouped wallet permissions. It allows an application to declare, in one place, the protocol access, spending authorization, basket access, and certificate disclosure capabilities it expects to request from the user.

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BRC-97Extensible Proof-Type Format for Specific Key Linkage Claims

This BRC defines an extensible format for including zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) in specific key linkage revelations as per BRC-69 Method 2. While BRC-94 addresses limitations of BRC-69 Method 1 through a Schnorr-based ZKP, there is currently no standardized method for provable specific key linkage claims in Method 2. Given the rapid evolution of ZKP technologies, this specification introduces a proof-type enumeration scheme to accommodate future proof mechanisms. By defining a flexible proof-type field, we allow for the inclusion of various ZKP schemes as they become available, ensuring that wallets and applications can adopt and support them over time, eventually converging on standardized formats.

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BRC-98P Protocols: Allowing future wallet protocol permission schemes

The BRC-43 architecture for wallet protocol permissions enables a wide range of use cases. By reserving protocol identifiers and preventing their use by applications, we ensure compatibility with future standards, supporting the future development of new protocol permission schemes.

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BRC-99P Baskets: Allowing Future Wallet Basket and Digital Asset Permission Schemes

The BRC-46 architecture for digital assets stored within wallet baskets enables a wide range of use cases. However, it lacks support for more than a rudimentary permission system. Wallets can grant applications blanket access to basketed assets, or deny access entirely, but cannot make insightful decisions based on the specific assets stored, their output scripts, or the tokenized value they represent. To support the future development of new permission schemes covering fungible and non-fungible digital assets within wallets, we propose reserving certain basket identifiers to prevent their use by applications and ensure compatibility with future standards.

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BRC-100Unified, Vendor-Neutral, Unchanging, and Open BSV Blockchain Standard Wallet-to-Application Interface

We define the BSV Blockchain’s standard wallet-to-application interface. This interface defines a robust and secure communication protocol between BSV wallets and applications. This protocol, built on the MetaNet architectural principles, aims to standardize the interaction between wallets and decentralized applications in the BSV ecosystem. The interface is designed to be vendor-neutral, supporting a wide range of implementations, ensuring interoperability, and promoting openness across different wallet and app vendors.

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BRC-109PCW-1 : Peer Cash Wallet Protocol

This work specifies a Bitcoin wallet workflow that conducts direct IP-to-IP negotiation between two identified parties and settles a payment as many independent on-chain transactions (“notes”). Identity keys are used only for ECDH and message authentication; they never appear on-chain. For each invoice and note index, a shared secret and an invoice fingerprint deterministically derive a unique recipient public key, ensuring unlinkability outside the two parties. The payer splits the total into bounded denominations agreed with the recipient and constructs one standard P2PKH transaction per note. Each transaction is funded with a disjoint input set and (if required) returns change to a per-note sender address derived deterministically so that change never overlaps across notes. Either party may submit any subset of fully signed transactions at any time; settlement is established by confirmation depth. The paper formalises notation, message frames, per-note key derivation, deterministic bounded splitting, disjoint coin-selection and change algorithms, ordering and pacing of broadcasts, selective-disclosure receipts, reissue rules prior to broadcast, and behaviours under reorgs. The result is a practical, auditable, and privacy-preserving method to enforce recipient constraints while keeping every note an independent on-chain payment.

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BRC-111P Labels: Allowing Future Wallet Action Label Permission Schemes

The BRC-65 and BRC-100 label system enables applications to organize and query actions. However, labels are also used in permission checks (e.g. for listActions), which limits extensibility for module-defined labeling and querying schemes. This specification reserves a label prefix to allow wallets to delegate label permissioning and label-specific behavior to installed modules, while preserving the core principle that labels remain organizational metadata.

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BRC-112Balance Baskets: Backwards-Compatible Basket Balance Queries

This specification defines a backwards-compatible extension to BRC-100 that allows applications to query a basket’s balance using a balance prefix in listOutputs. The wallet returns no outputs and re-purposes totalOutputs to report the sum of satoshis contained in all outputs in the specified basket. P-basket module balances retain the numeric representation described below, with exact internal aggregation before conversion to a numeric summary.

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BRC-114Time Labels: Backwards-Compatible Action Timestamp Filters for List Actions

This specification defines a backwards-compatible extension to BRC-100 that allows applications to filter listActions results by wallet-tracked action timestamps using reserved query labels. The response format remains unchanged.

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BRC-116Wallet Permissions and Counterparty Trust

This document fully specifies how BRC-100 wallets handle application permission requests.

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BRC-123Basket Permission Scheme Registry and Governance

We define a governance framework for BRC-99 basket permission schemes. BRC-99 reserves basket identifiers beginning with p for future permission schemes and establishes the format p <scheme-id> <basket-name>, but defines no process for registering scheme IDs, no taxonomy for classifying schemes, and no consolidated reference for the basket name reservations scattered across multiple wallet BRCs.

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BRC-153Action Reference Labels for BRC-100 Wallets

This specification defines a backwards-compatible extension to BRC-100 that exposes each action’s wallet reference as a synthetic label on listActions results. No new request or response fields are introduced, and the label is not persisted as ordinary action metadata.

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BRC-154Pluggable Backup Services for BRC-140 Share Vaults

This BRC defines an HTTP backup service profile for optional recovery of BRC-140 key shares. A backup service stores at most one BRC-140 share per authenticated account and releases it only after authentication. Wallets may enroll a list of independent service URLs, deposit distinct shares across them under a threshold scheme, and reconstruct the key locally after obtaining enough shares.

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BRC-155Pull-Based Receive Discovery

This standard specifies how a wallet discovers unsolicited incoming payments to addresses it has previously handed out, without cooperation from the sender and without scanning an unbounded derivation space. It defines a tracked list of explicitly handed-out receive addresses, a discovery procedure that internalizes each new deposit exactly once (SPV verification is performed within the internalize step), a pruning procedure that retires stale addresses while never orphaning funds, and a deterministic recovery procedure for a fresh device. A reference implementation with a fully injected engine, network, and persistence layer accompanies this document.

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BRC-164Output Identity Tags for BRC-100 Wallets

This specification defines a tag convention for BRC-100: an output tag prefix id: that carries a stable list key for a held output. Callers use it with ordinary listOutputs tag filters. It does not change the BRC-100 request or response shape, and it does not require special wallet storage behavior beyond normal tags.

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BRC-177Wallet-Enforced Expiry for `noSend` Actions

This specification defines the BRC-111 module label p nosend expiry for bounded, prefunded BRC-100 noSend actions and dependent action batches. Finite modes reclaim an unpublished root after a deadline. The explicit never mode permanently treats released payment value as sent and never reclaims it. The wallet publishes protected actions only on an explicit, authorized sendWith request; otherwise a recipient or application may publish them.

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BRC-179Signed Capability Manifest for Wallet and Tool-Server Method Exposure

This BRC defines a capability manifest: a declarative, risk-tiered, operator-gated document that enumerates exactly which SDK methods and tool-server (MCP) methods a wallet or wallet-adjacent product exposes, together with a runtime enforcer that refuses any method not affirmatively declared and enabled. Each exposed method is a Capability with a globally-unique id of the form product.surface.method, a risk tier drawn from an ordered taxonomy (READ, VERIFY, OPS, CRYPTO, IDENTITY, NETWORK, SPEND, ADMIN), and an optional operator allow-overlay. Read/verify tiers are exposed by default; every tier that mutates state, uses a key, moves value, asserts identity, or reaches the network is withheld by default until an operator affirmatively allows it. The set of (id, tier, effective-enabled) triples is reduced to a domain-separated SHA-256 fingerprint that is stable under documentation edits but changes the instant a capability is added, re-tiered, or toggled. That fingerprint is baked into the build as a pin: at construction the enforcer refuses to run if the loaded manifest does not fingerprint to the pin, so a swapped or edited manifest file cannot widen the exposed surface at runtime; Section 9 states precisely what that does and does not cover. Decisions are fail-closed: an undeclared method is denied, never silently allowed. Where BRC-100 governs per-session application requests and BRC-103/104 govern who is calling, this specification governs the orthogonal supply-side axis (which methods are callable at all) and it is designed to be sealed by a content-anchor code-provenance ordinal.

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BRC-181Wallet-Enforced Autonomous-Agent Spend Policy

This BRC specifies a wallet-enforced spend policy that lets an autonomous software agent (e.g. an LLM-driven MCP client) spend from a dedicated, isolated wallet account without a human in the loop for every transaction, while guaranteeing that the agent can never move funds outside a signed, operator-authorized envelope. It defines: (1) a signed, canonicalized PolicyRecord binding an agent identity to per-transaction / rolling-period / lifetime caps, a canonical destination allowlist, rate and circuit-breaker limits, and an expiry; (2) a canonical destination format over both P2PKH hash160 and arbitrary script-hash, closing the raw-script allowlist bypass; (3) the exact, ordered set of checks a wallet MUST perform per createAction, with an atomic check->reserve->debit ledger that is safe under concurrent (high-frequency) spends; (4) fail-closed rules for broadcast uncertainty, freezes, and malformed requests; and (5) instant revocation. The policy is enforced entirely by the wallet; nothing in the agent’s request is trusted except as input to be validated against the policy. A second implementer can build an interoperable enforcement engine from the Specification and Test Vectors alone.

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BRC-184Optional Metadata Registries and Their Stewardship

ProtoMap, BasketMap and CertMap associate wallet protocol identifiers, output baskets and certificate types with understandable names, descriptions, documentation and images. This specification explains those registries and defines a limited role for their stewards: improving public information, without deciding who may implement a protocol, request a wallet operation or use an application.

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BRC-185Wallet Substrate Discovery, Selection, and Encrypted Mobile Connections

This proposal specifies how applications discover multiple wallets, select one wallet per connection, and carry the complete BRC-100 core interface over local, embedded, extension, and encrypted mobile substrates. Separately specified additive getVersion metadata is permitted under section 1 without negotiating away any core method or guarantee. It defines ascending localhost port allocation, a neutral chooser contract, origin-scoped selection memory, safe switching, a vendor-neutral pairing URI, and a mandatory encrypted mobile relay profile. Discovery, connection management, and user interfaces are composable components outside the core SDK. Applications can use automatic selection or supply their own user experience, including commercial onboarding wrappers.

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BRC-188User Management Protocol (UMP)

The User Management Protocol (UMP) represents a recoverable wallet account with an on-chain, spendable account descriptor. The descriptor contains encrypted copies of the account’s root keys, hashes used for discovery, encrypted recovery factors, and, optionally, encrypted profiles and password derivation metadata. Any two of a presentation key, a password, and a recovery key can recover the account. Changing those factors normally spends the current descriptor and creates its successor while preserving the account’s underlying keys.

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BRC-189Identity, Certificates, Discovery, and Personal Trust in Applications

An application can address a person by a cryptographic identity key, discover attributes that the person has chosen to publish, and request further certified information directly from that person. The application need not create another username directory, require an account at a particular wallet vendor, or ask a central identity provider to authorize every interaction. The user’s wallet supplies identity operations, applies the user’s chosen trust relationships, and preserves personal associations through contacts.

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BRC-204Agent Allowances

This specification defines an agent allowance: a sum of money that a wallet owner sets aside for an autonomous agent, which the agent can spend with its own key and the owner can take back at any time in one transaction. An allowance is held in ordinary transaction outputs under a two-branch locking script, so its limit is a property of the money itself rather than a policy enforced by software. The proposal specifies how allowances are created, delivered to the agent, spent, reported and swept; how an agent proves it acts for an owner using a BRC-52 certificate that the sweep also revokes; and how the resulting transactions form a receipt that anyone can check against block headers. It uses existing BRC-100 wallet methods and adds no new ones. It complements BRC-181, which bounds agents that spend through the owner’s wallet, by covering agents that hold their own key and run elsewhere.

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BRC-205Extensible Wallet Version Strings and Account Labels

This proposal defines a bounded vendor-major.minor.patch; key=value; format for the string returned by getVersion, a process for future BRCs to define attributes, and one initial attribute: account-label. The label lets an application describe an existing account using the name its user currently recognizes. A wallet might initially return Pocket Photos Account and later return Metanet Account, without changing the account or the wallet’s software version.

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BRC-206Wallet-Native Rabin Signatures as a BRC-98 Module

This specification defines rabin, a BRC-98 permission-module scheme that lets an application obtain Rabin signatures over arbitrary data, and the matching Rabin public key, from a BRC-100 wallet. The Rabin private key is derived deterministically from the wallet’s BRC-42/43 root for a protocol-scoped identity and never leaves the wallet.

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BRC-2071Color Wallet Module

This specification defines the canonical color wallet module for fungible assets under 1Color (BRC-162), including the BRC-161 encoding of the same token model. It combines counterparty-derived custody, per-asset baskets, overlay-verified admission, amount-aware spending consent, input selection, change, issuance, authority operations, burns and composable multi-asset swaps. It supports arbitrary foreign scripts and both complete and partially signed transactions through the existing BRC-100 interface.

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BRC-208Vault Sub-Accounts

This standard defines how a wallet keeps any number of accounts under one vault master, the single secret the user backs up. Each account is a complete BRC-100 wallet with its own identity key, outputs, and history.

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BRC-2091Color Minimal Resource Profile

This specification defines one required processing profile for BRC-207 resources whose applications do not require token provenance, conserved quantities, issuer authorization or overlay admission. The wallet protects signing keys, identified transaction outputs and satoshis. It makes no fungible-token validity, scarcity or lineage claim for these resources. The profile uses the existing BRC-162 declaration, script prefix and module interfaces.

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BRC-212Compact Wallet Feature Flags in `getVersion`

This proposal defines one BRC-205 attribute, brc212, whose value is a bit mask of wallet feature flags written in the base64url digit alphabet, six flags per character. Each flag stands for one boolean capability advertisement, at one revision, defined by some other BRC. A wallet supporting all four capabilities advertised today returns example-1.2.3; brc212=P; (24 bytes) instead of example-1.2.3; brc207-color=4; brc207-color-attested=1; brc175-offline=2; brc177-nosend=2; (90 bytes).

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BRC-213Native UTXO-Chain Coins in a BRC-100 Wallet

This document lets a BRC-100 wallet hold the coins of another UTXO proof-of-work chain, such as Litecoin, natively. The coins stay on their own chain under a key derived from the wallet’s root. Nothing is wrapped, minted, burned or held by a bridge, an issuer or a federation, and BSV carries no record of them.

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BRC-214Wallet Asset Profiles

A BRC-100 wallet holds more than one kind of value: BSV, coins of other chains, items, Bitcoin Native Tokens (BNT) and Issuer-Permissioned Tokens (IPT). Each kind has its own storage, its own proof of authenticity, and its own way for applications to see and move it.

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BRC-219Wallet Permission Prompt Liveness Contract

This BRC defines the liveness contract for wallet requests that require user permission. When an application sends a valid wallet request and the wallet requires user consent before responding, the request is allowed to remain pending until the user grants or denies the request. Application developers should treat such pending requests as normal wallet behavior, not as failures to be timed out. Wallets, in turn, must ensure that any permission-dependent pending request is visibly and reliably presented to the user on desktop and mobile.

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BRC-221Deterministic, Order-Independent Coin Selection for Privacy Wallets

Coin selection is the step in which a wallet chooses which of its spendable outputs to spend in order to fund a transaction. A privacy-motivated chooser treats the outputs of one key as a single all-or-nothing unit, so that assembling a payment from several keys does not disclose more of the holder’s balance than it has to, and it randomises its choice among the sufficient subsets so that the selection carries no fixed pattern. A wallet does not observe the chain itself: it learns which outputs it holds from a source that returns them in some order, and that source chooses the order. This BRC shows that if the chooser’s randomised search walks the candidate outputs in the order the source enumerates them, the source keeps a channel into the result. It can bias which of the holder’s keys are spent together, and so publicly linked, in one transaction, and two spends built from the same set of outputs can differ when the set is enumerated in two different orders. This BRC requires that coin selection be a pure function of the candidate output set and a wallet-held secret, invariant under every permutation of the order in which the candidates are enumerated. It gives a conforming construction, specified to the byte: a canonical serialisation of an outpoint, a canonical order over candidates and over the all-or-nothing groups derived from that serialisation, a pseudo-random source seeded from the canonical serialisation of the set and the wallet secret, and a search that runs over the canonical order so that no step can see the enumeration order. It states a conformance test, that one output set enumerated in any order yields one selection, and it states what is left to the implementation: the objective that ranks sufficient subsets, and the construction of change. Test vectors fix a candidate set, a wallet secret and several target amounts, and show the selection is identical across a batch of input permutations.

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BRC-229Wallet-Native Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication as a BRC-98 Module

This specification defines ecpm, a BRC-98 permission-module scheme for applying a wallet-derived secp256k1 scalar to an arbitrary caller-supplied curve point, or removing that scalar by applying its modular inverse.

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BRC-249Vault Account Holding Across Devices

A BRC-208 vault master opens many accounts, and the same backup can be restored on several devices. Two installs that open one account are two spenders of one key. Each picks coins from its own copy of the account’s state, and they double-spend each other. This BRC keeps every account on exactly one install at a time, without a network request on the spend path.

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BRC-250Device Login and Recovery

This draft lets a user sign in to a self-custodial wallet on a new device with their email address. The host validates and relays. It never holds the vault or a share of it.

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BRC-325User-Initiated Browser Permission Requests for Wallet Discovery

This document specifies what an application MUST do in the seconds before a browser asks the user whether a site may reach the wallet running on their own computer.

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BRC-326Wallet Failure Presentation

This document specifies what a wallet MUST say when a request fails, and what an application MUST do with it.

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Transactions

Standards for representing and conveying transaction data, and templates for specific types of transactions:

BRCTitle
BRC-8Everett-style Transaction Envelopes

This document outlines the BRC-8 standard for Everett-style Transaction Envelopes. The standard defines the structure and format of the envelopes used to send Bitcoin transactions. The primary goal of this standard is to ensure interoperability between different Bitcoin wallet software and services, allowing them to exchange transaction data in a consistent manner. This standard also aims to facilitate the implementation of the Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) process, as defined in BRC-9, by providing a standardized methodology for exchanging merkle proofs and input transactions.

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BRC-9Simplified Payment Verification

The BRC-9 specification defines a process for Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) that allows payment recipients to verify the validity of a transaction without downloading and verifying the entire blockchain. The process involves verifying the headers and proofs of a BRC-8 Transaction Envelope, ensuring that all SPV proofs link back to the genesis block and the chain with the most proof of-work, and confirming that the transaction is valid according to the rules of Bitcoin. This standard aims to facilitate fast, secure, and efficient payment processing for merchants and users.

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BRC-10Merkle proof standardised format

This BRC serves as a reference point for the TSC Merkle Proof Standardized Format. It is identified as BRC-10 and is used to avoid ambiguity in referring to the TSC standard, just like other proposals like BRC-11 (which revise or extend this specification) are referenced by their BRC numbers.

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BRC-11TSC Proof Format with Heights

This is an argument for using block height as the standard for indexing block headers within merkle proofs.

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BRC-12Raw Transaction Format

This BRC specifies the format used for raw hex Bitcoin transactions, which are a widely-used way of representing Bitcoin transactions on the network. The specification includes details on the layout and various fields within Bitcoin transactions.

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BRC-13TXO Transaction Object Format

This document presents the technical standard for the TXO (Transaction Object) format, a structured representation of Bitcoin transactions that enables powerful queries, processes, and filters. The TXO format captures transaction data in a hierarchical structure, facilitating its storage in document databases (e.g., MongoDB) and enabling real-time filtering with JSON filter libraries (e.g., JQ).

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BRC-30Transaction Extended Format (EF)

Regular Bitcoin transactions do not contain all the data that is needed to verify that the signatures in the transactions are valid. To sign an input of a Bitcoin transaction, the signer needs to know the transaction ID, output index, output satoshis and the locking script of the input transaction. When sending a Bitcoin transaction to a node, only the previous transaction ID and the output index are part of the serialized transaction, the node will look up the locking script and output amount of the input transaction.

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BRC-58Merkle Path JSON format

We present a data model and JSON format for a Merkle Path which will be passed from a Transaction Lookup service to a Lite Client via web API.

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BRC-61Compound Merkle Path Format

We propose a binary format for Compound Merkle Paths (CMP hereon) optimized for minimal data bandwidth during transmission.

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BRC-62Background Evaluation Extended Format (BEEF) Transactions

We propose a binary format for sending Transactions between peers to allow Simple Payment Verification (SPV). The format is optimized for minimal bandwidth while maintaining data required to independently validate the transaction in full.

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BRC-67Simplified Payment Verification

Defining Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) without external reference for sake of clarity.

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BRC-71Merkle Path Binary Format

We propose a binary format for a Single Merkle Path optimized for storage in a key value database.

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BRC-74BSV Unified Merkle Path (BUMP) Format

We propose the BSV Unified Merkle Path format in both binary and JSON encoding optimized for generation by transaction processors, and also happens to be convenient for proof validating clients.

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BRC-76Graph Aware Sync Protocol

GASP is designed to synchronize transaction data between two parties in a blockchain environment. It ensures the legitimacy and completeness of transaction data using a recursive reconciliation method.

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BRC-83Scalable Transaction Processing in the BSV Network

The BSV network is designed to process transactions at scale, leveraging a robust, distributed system of miners, validators, and aggregators. This system balances parallel processing with sequential validation, ensuring transactions are both processed rapidly and recorded in the correct order. Below, we document the detailed processes by which BSV miners will come to handle transactions at scale.

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BRC-95Atomic BEEF Transactions

This BRC defines Atomic Background Evaluation Extended Format (Atomic BEEF) Transactions, a variant of the BEEF transaction format (as defined in BRC-62) that focuses on atomicity,specifically, ensuring that all the data within a BEEF structure relates to a single “subject transaction.” This format disallows unrelated transactions within the BEEF structure, reinforcing a clear, minimalistic data set for transaction validation while maintaining efficiency in bandwidth usage.

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BRC-96BEEF V2 Txid Only Extension

The BEEF serialization format (as defined in BRC-62) is essentially two things: an array of mined transaction proof validation data (BUMPs, BRC-74) and an array of serialized Bitcoin transactions.

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BRC-119SubTree Unified Merkle Path (STUMP) Format

We define the SubTree Unified Merkle Path (STUMP) format for encoding merkle paths within a subtree of a block, rather than across an entire block. A STUMP adapts the binary encoding specified in BRC-74 (BSV Unified Merkle Path / BUMP) for subtree scope, replacing the block height with a single-byte tree height header and an optional trailing block hash. The level and leaf encoding is identical to BRC-74. This enables scalable merkle proof generation and delivery in architectures where blocks are partitioned into subtrees for parallel processing.

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BRC-124Multicast Transaction Frame Format

This BRC specifies the wire format for transporting BSV transactions over IPv6 multicast and TCP/UDP unicast. The format extends the legacy BRC-12 frame with additional fields for flow identification, sequence tracking, and subtree identification. All fields are 8-byte aligned for efficient memory access on 64-bit architectures. The frame is transport-agnostic: the on-wire bytes are identical under Any-Source (ASM) and Source-Specific (SSM) multicast. Multicast group addressing, scopes, and the SSM (S,G) join and source-discovery model are specified in BRC-129; the frame’s source is the emitting proxy (senderIPv6, the first HashKey ingredient).

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BRC-126Multicast Transaction NACK Retransmission Protocol

This BRC specifies the NACK-based retransmission and endpoint discovery protocol for the BSV multicast transaction distribution pipeline. It defines five UDP datagram formats, ADVERT, NACK, MISS, ACK, and THROTTLED, along with tier/preference-based endpoint selection, an escalation state machine, and configurable retransmit modes. The protocol operates on top of the BRC-124 data-plane and enables reliable gap recovery without requiring connection state at the ingress or listener tiers.

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BRC-127Multicast Subtree Group Announcement Frame Format

This BRC specifies a periodic multicast announcement protocol that maps BRC-124 SubtreeID values to stable 128-bit group identifiers. Senders broadcast compact 64-byte datagrams on a reserved control-plane multicast group, allowing listeners to dynamically learn which subtree IDs belong to which groups and filter incoming transaction traffic accordingly, without static configuration.

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BRC-128Multicast Extended Transaction Frame Format

This BRC specifies a payload variant for the BRC-124 multicast frame format in which the transaction payload uses the BRC-30 Extended Format (EF) instead of the BRC-12 raw transaction format. The 92-byte BRC-124 header is unchanged; the payload is self-identifying via the BRC-30 EF marker. This enables multicast receivers and broadcast services to fully validate transaction signatures and fee amounts without external UTXO lookups.

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BRC-129IPv6 Multicast Group Address Assignments

This BRC specifies the IPv6 multicast group address scheme for the BSV transaction sharding pipeline. It defines how the 16-bit shard index space is allocated across data-plane shard groups and control-plane service groups, how addresses are derived from the IANA Bitcoin multicast allocation, and the canonical addresses for beacon discovery, subtree announcement, and the block control channel. The scheme defines addressing for both Any-Source Multicast (ASM, the default) and Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) transport modes, selected per deployment without any change to the frame, NACK, or sharding semantics.

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BRC-130Multicast Transaction Frame Fragmentation

This BRC specifies a fragmentation extension to the BRC-124 Multicast Transaction Frame Format. When a BSV transaction payload exceeds the path MTU available on a multicast fabric, the proxy decomposes the payload into a sequence of fixed-size fragment datagrams. Listeners reassemble the fragments and verify the reconstructed payload against the transaction ID before forwarding. The fragment header is a strict superset of the BRC-124 header, enabling mixed-version infrastructure to identify and discard fragment frames it cannot process.

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BRC-131Multicast Block Announcement Frame Format

This BRC specifies the wire format for distributing block data over the IPv6 multicast fabric. A new frame version (0x04) reuses the BRC-124 92-byte header layout and carries either a block announcement, whose payload is a complete BRC-144 block object, or a standalone coinbase transaction, delivered to all subscribers via a dedicated control-plane multicast group (FF0E::B:FFFE). On this fabric a block announcement and the block data are the same thing: the announcement carries the block. The standalone coinbase message type (MsgType 0x02) is deprecated but retained and reserved; see the CoinbaseTx Payload section and BRC-133.

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BRC-132Multicast Subtree Data Frame Format

This BRC defines frame version 0x05 for distributing complete Merkle subtree contents, transaction hashes and optional per-transaction metadata, over the IPv6 multicast fabric. Subtree data frames are delivered to all subscribers via the dedicated GroupSubtreeDataAnnounce multicast group (FF0X::B:FFFB), independently of the per-shard groups used for individual transaction distribution.

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BRC-133Multicast Coinbase Transaction Frame Format

This BRC defines the policy and wire mechanism for distributing coinbase transactions over the IPv6 multicast fabric. Coinbase transactions are carried as a dedicated message type within BRC-131 block control frames and delivered to all subscribers via the control-plane multicast group, independently of the shard groups used for ordinary transaction distribution.

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BRC-134Multicast Anchor Transaction Frame Format

This BRC defines a new frame version (0x06) for distributing chained anchor transactions over the IPv6 multicast fabric. An anchor transaction is the root (first) transaction in a chain of dependent transactions. Because all subsequent transactions in the chain reference the anchor as an input, every subscriber must receive it regardless of which shard its TxID would otherwise hash to.

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BRC-135Multicast Block Header Frame Format

This BRC specifies how standalone 80-byte BSV block headers are distributed to downstream consumers, in two forms. The datagram form wraps the header in a minimal 172-byte frame that reuses the 92-byte BRC-124 header layout, ensuring compatibility with existing infrastructure classifiers and firewall rules, and is carried over IPv6 multicast or unicast datagrams. The stream form writes the bare 80-byte header, with no frame at all, on a single-class byte stream dedicated to headers. Both are produced by splitting the block header out of a BRC-131 block announcement.

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BRC-139Multicast Shard Manifest Announcement Protocol

This BRC specifies the shard manifest announcement protocol for the BSV multicast transaction distribution pipeline. It defines a single UDP datagram format, ShardManifest (MsgType 0x40), by which any participant periodically declares its shard_bits configuration and the set of shard groups it has joined. Manifests are emitted directly to the control-plane beacon group (0xFFFD, see BRC-129), the same group used by BRC-126 ADVERT beacons, and are distinguished by their MsgType byte. The protocol provides operator visibility into network-wide sharding configuration, enables cross-peer divergence detection, and defines a normative consumer profile for automated, rate-limited shard-bit coordination. It is observation-only by default: there is no retransmission and no acknowledgment.

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BRC-142Multicast Transaction Bundle Frame Format

This BRC specifies a coalescing extension to the BRC-124 and BRC-128 Multicast Transaction Frame Formats. A bundle packs many small BSV transactions, standard (BRC-12 raw) or Extended Format (BRC-30 EF), that share one shard group and subtree into a single datagram, so a payload that would otherwise cross a multicast fabric as N small packets crosses it as one. It is the inverse of BRC-130 fragmentation, which splits one oversized transaction across many datagrams. Bundling reduces packets-per-second, the dominant per-packet forwarding cost of multicast fan-out, without changing transaction semantics.

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BRC-143Subtree Data Frame Format

This BRC specifies the push wire form of a subtree, an ordered list of transaction node hashes plus the merkle root that identifies it, for delivery and ingest over a byte stream. A subtree names its member transactions by hash; a receiver reconstructs the subtree and verifies it against the carried root. All frame integers are fixed-width big-endian; there is no length prefix beyond the node count.

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BRC-144Block Frame Format

This BRC specifies the push wire form of a block, the 80-byte block header, block-level counts, the ordered list of subtree roots the block references, the full coinbase transaction, the block height, and the coinbase merkle path, for delivery and ingest over a byte stream. It carries everything a receiver needs to assemble and validate the block without a follow-up fetch. All frame integers are fixed-width big-endian; consensus-defined payloads (the header, the coinbase transaction, the BUMP) keep their native serialisation.

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BRC-148Multicast Shard Domain Partitioning and the BEEF Object Plane

This BRC extends the IPv6 multicast group address scheme of BRC-129 by partitioning the 16-bit shard-index space into independent object planes, each identified by a 4-bit domain selector in the high nibble of the index. The existing transaction plane (raw and Extended Format transactions) is retained unchanged as domain 0x0; a new BEEF object plane is allocated as domain 0x1 to carry BRC-62, BRC-95, and BRC-96 BEEF-family transaction objects for peer-to-peer and overlay synchronisation. The BEEF plane shards by overlay topic: each object carries a topic identifier from which its multicast group is derived by the BRC-129 top-bits rule, and overlay-tier subscribers filter delivery by elected topic and by BEEF version (encoding). Each plane subscribes and publishes independently and may run its own shard-bit width. This BRC also forward-extends the BRC-139 shard-manifest protocol with a per-domain descriptor section so each plane can advertise and coordinate its own shard_bits and generation transitions without disturbing the others. The transaction plane’s on-wire addresses, frames, and manifests are byte-identical to their pre-BRC-148 form; this is a strictly additive extension.

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BRC-149Multicast BEEF Object Frame Format

This BRC specifies the three wire forms of the BRC-148 BEEF object plane: the multicast object frame (FrameVer 0x09, assigned here), which carries one BEEF-family transaction object on the plane’s domain-tagged shard groups; the submission record, the unicast envelope a publisher sends to operator ingress naming one object to one or more overlay topics; and the delivery record, the unicast envelope a delivery edge streams to a subscriber. The frame reuses the BRC-124 92-byte header layout at identical offsets, so existing classifiers, retransmission, and fragmentation infrastructure require no changes. The records exist because BEEF bytes are not self-delimiting without a full structural parse, which the fabric never performs, so unlike the BRC-143/BRC-144 push lanes, BEEF lanes carry an explicit length-carrying envelope.

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BRC-158Outpoint BEEF

Outpoint BEEF is Atomic BEEF with a subject outpoint instead of a subject transaction id. Encoding, inclusion, and validation follow BRC-95 except as in the table below. The body is a standard BRC-62 / BRC-96 BEEF. Use for proofs scoped to a specific output (e.g. 1Sat tip provenance in BRC-150).

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BRC-233Subject BEEF

Subject BEEF is Atomic BEEF in shape (a prefix and a subject transaction id in front of a BRC-96 BEEF V2) without BRC-95’s restriction to the subject’s ancestors. The subject names which transaction the bag is about. Anything else in the bag is allowed: a profile decides what must be present.

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BRC-237Payment Evidence Statements for BREAD and BEEF

This BRC defines a payment evidence statement, a small canonical JSON object in which a receiver records what it verified about an unmined payment and what it did not: the ancestors anchored by a Merkle path to a header it trusts, whether every input reaches one, the longest and shortest unconfirmed distance to an anchor, which unconfirmed transactions passed script, amount and lock-time checks, and the payment’s observed status. A receiver that reports ancestry distance, as BREAD does, and a receiver that holds a BEEF can each make one from the evidence it already has. No statement says that a payment will be mined. The BRC also converts Electrum-form Merkle branches to BRC-74 paths and defines an optional signature and wallet method.

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Scripts

Standards for representing and conveying Script, pseudo-opcodes and templates for specific types of scripts:

BRCTitle
BRC-14Bitcoin Script Binary, Hex and ASM Formats

Bitcoin uses scripts to control transactions, and three of the most common ways to represent a script are binary, hexadecimal, and ASM. This standard aims to provide a detailed description of these formats to facilitate their use in BSV transactions.

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BRC-15Bitcoin Script Assembly Language

Bitcoin script is a programming language used in Bitcoin transactions to control the spending of coins. While the Bitcoin script opcodes are machine-readable, they are not easily human-readable. We define an assembly language that provides a human-readable format for expressing Bitcoin script opcodes, making it easier for developers to understand and write Bitcoin scripts. This specification defines the rules for expressing Bitcoin script opcodes in assembly format, including indentation, comments, expressing text strings and numbers, templating and other guidelines.

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BRC-16Pay to Public Key Hash

The Pay-to-Public-Key-Hash (P2PKH) output script is a commonly used script in the Bitcoin network that allows users to send funds to a specific Bitcoin address. This standard provides a detailed specification of the P2PKH output script, providing detail on the operations performed, and giving examples for serialized Bitcoin addresses.

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BRC-17Pay to R Puzzle Hash

The R-puzzle technique is a powerful cryptographic tool that can be used to create Bitcoin output scripts that can be unlocked by anyone who is able to solve for a value k, without revealing k to the world. The technique relies on the fact that in an ECDSA digital signature, the R component is computed by multiplying a generator point on the elliptic curve with this k-value. By constructing a Bitcoin output script that requires knowledge of this value, it is possible to create puzzles that can be solved by anyone who is able to compute the correct value for k. The R-puzzle technique is flexible and can be used for a variety of applications, including those that benefit when the solver does not reveal their solution to the world, only proving knowledge of it. R-puzzles also provide a way to create Bitcoin output scripts that can be unlocked without requiring knowledge of a specific private key, while still maintaining a high level of security and cryptographic strength. By serializing short-hand script templates in a standard way, implementers can maintain ecosystem-wide compatibility.

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BRC-18Pay to False Return

The OP_FALSE OP_RETURN script template is a method for storing data on the Bitcoin SV blockchain. It creates a non-spendable output and appends the desired data to the end of the script for storage. This standard aims to define the rules and best practices for using this script template.

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BRC-19Pay to True Return

In one view of Bitcoin, only spendable output scripts with satoshis attached constitute valid Bitcoin tokens, because Bitcoin tokens are UTXOs. Since traditional BRC-18 scripts are not compatible with this view, we propose a methodology for creating OP_RETURN scripts that are spendable and contain satoshis. This provides a way for software to automatically convert non-compliant OP_RETURNs into proper Bitcoin tokens while encouraging developers to consider the spendability constraints that govern their tokens.

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BRC-21Push TX

Push TX is a technique that enables users to enforce and access transactional states and conditions within Bitcoin script using ECDSA signature messages. It allows for the enforcement of several transaction elements, such as the number of inputs, nSequence values, input and output values, and script conditions, as well as the ability to specify the script into which tokens will be spent. The Push TX algorithm works by pushing the transaction pre-image message that generates the signature onto the stack as part of the input’s unlocking script. This message can be pushed as a single contiguous blob, multiple separate elements, or as a partial set, with the remaining elements of the message set via the output’s locking script. The signature is then computed on-chain within the script and checked against the public key using OP_CHECKSIG to ensure the current transaction is valid. This standard outlines the motivation and specifications for implementing the Push TX technique within Bitcoin script.

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BRC-47Bare Multi-Signature

This BRC standard outlines the implementation and use of bare multi-signature (multi-sig) transaction output scripts within the Bitcoin SV digital asset ecosystem. By employing OP_MULTISIG opcodes directly, this approach offers simplicity and ease of implementation while providing enhanced security and access control for transactions. However, it also highlights the trade-offs in terms of privacy for participants. The standard comprises a motivation section, detailing the benefits of bare multi-sig transactions; a specification section, explaining the structure of these transactions; an example section, demonstrating a 2-of-3 multi-signature locking and unlocking script; and a “how it works” section, delving into the fundamentals of bare multi-sig transactions and their role in the Bitcoin SV ecosystem.

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BRC-48Pay to Push Drop

This standard provides a script template that enables data-rich tokens on the Bitcoin SV blockchain, while still allowing for the representation of transfers of ownership. By pushing arbitrary data into stack elements and subsequently dropping them, followed by adding a simple P2PK lock, this script template allows for the creation of tokens with metadata, which can be exchanged on overlay networks. This standard facilitates improved scalability by representing tokens as UTXOs, which can be easily modeled and used in graph structures.

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BRC-106Bitcoin Script ASM Format

This proposal introduces a standardised method of dealing with the ASM representation of Bitcoin Script across the ecosystem language libraries (Py-SDK, TS-SDK, Go-SDK, Teranode etc).

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BRC-173Bitcoin Script to and from Bitcoin BASIC: a compiler and a decompiler

Bitcoin Script is a stack machine with no names, no types and no structure a reader can hold. It is also, almost exactly, the machine that sits underneath every infix expression evaluator written for an 8-bit microcomputer: v = v + f/m - v*d becomes the same sequence of stack operations in either.

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BRC-215Block-Height Deadline Covenant Templates (OP_PUSH_TX)

This BRC defines a deadline gate: a fixed sequence of script opcodes, parameterised by one block height D, that lets an output be spent through it only by a transaction that has that one input, whose nLockTime is a block height of at least D, and whose input’s sequence number is 0xFFFFFFFE, so that lock-time enforcement is in force. The gate reads these from the transaction’s own signature preimage, which the unlocking script pushes and the gate authenticates with the Push TX technique of BRC-21. It refuses the two values that make a bare nLockTime >= D comparison worthless: an input sequence number of 0xFFFFFFFF, which makes the transaction final at once, and an nLockTime of 500,000,000 or more, which consensus reads as a Unix time. Consensus then refuses to mine the spend before height D + 1. The one-input rule and the one sequence number keep a spend through the gate, broadcast early and held by nodes as non-final, from blocking the other branch’s spend until the deadline. Three templates use the gate. Two place it in one branch of a two-branch script, beside a branch that spends at any time: one key now and another key after D (a vault’s recovery key and its time-gated hot key, an owner and a beneficiary), or m of n keys now and one key after D (a pooled fund that its contributors can reclaim); the third is the gate on its own, for a lock with no early exit. Every byte of the gate and the templates is specified, so a wallet can build them and recognise them, and the test vectors were checked against two interpreters that share no code.

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Tokens

Standards for defining and interacting with forms of tokens:

BRCTitle
BRC-20There is no BRC-20

This document serves to clarify that there is no BRC-20 standard for tokenization on Bitcoin SV. While Ethereum has the ERC-20 standard for account-based tokens, there is no equivalent for UTXO-based systems such as Bitcoin SV. In order to avoid confusion and prevent people from conflating ERC-20 with BRC-20, it is necessary to clarify that BRC-20 does not exist on Bitcoin SV. Instead, proposals for tokenization should be judged on their own merits. Being associated with ERC-20 will not make any specific tokenization proposal better, and there is not a desire to confer greater legitimacy to one proposal or another.

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BRC-45Definition of UTXOs as Bitcoin Tokens
BRC-79Token Exchange Protocol for UTXO-based Overlay Networks

We propose a peer-to-peer token exchange protocol under which two parties can securely exchange digital tokens (assets) within Bitcoin SV’s BRC-22 UTXO-based Overlay Networks.

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BRC-107Enhanced Mandala Token Protocol

This specification extends BRC-92 (Mandala Token Protocol) with cryptographic commitments to provide tamper-evident token amounts and SPV-friendly verification while maintaining the minimalist design philosophy. The enhancement adds a commitment hash to each token output that cryptographically binds the token amount to its transaction history, enabling lightweight clients to verify token integrity without accessing the full blockchain or trusting overlay networks.

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BRC-108Identity-Linked Token Protocol

This specification extends the Enhanced Mandala Token Protocol (BRC-107) with identity certificate integration based on BRC-52/53. It enables tokens to enforce real-world compliance requirements, KYC/AML regulations, and identity-based access controls while preserving privacy through selective field revelation. The protocol supports regulated security tokens, accredited investor requirements, geographic restrictions, and identity-based recovery mechanisms, all validated through SPV-friendly cryptographic proofs.

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BRC-113Merkle Proof Token
BRC-115Identity-Linked Deterministic Token Verification Framework

BRC-115 defines a deterministic, SPV-verifiable framework for identity-linked token transfers on Bitcoin SV. It specifies how wallets verify compliance requirements using BRC-0042 key derivation, BRC-0107 commitments, and BRC-0108 identity bindings, without relying on overlay networks or external validators.

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BRC-117Proof-of-Indexing Hash-to-Mint Tokens

This BRC defines a mechanism for minting BSV-21 tokens via Proof-of-Work where the hash preimage includes an indexing work commitment, a merkle root of verifiable overlay network activity. The token supply is locked in an sCrypt smart contract at deployment. The contract verifies the PoW solution on-chain and permanently records the work commitment, while an L2 gossip network verifies the honesty of the claimed work off-chain. This creates an economically incentivized, decentralized overlay network where nodes are rewarded for indexing BSV-21 token activity, serving content, and maintaining network connectivity.

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BRC-1471Sat Ordinals Basket Profile for BRC-46 / BRC-100

This BRC defines the application basket profile for 1Sat Ordinals under BRC-46 / BRC-100. It reserves the basket name 1sat, specifies eligibility of outputs placed in that basket, documents the tag vocabulary and BRC-37 customInstructions schema used for display and remittance, and describes normative hold / list / transfer / import flows via existing wallet interface methods.

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BRC-1501Sat Provenance Remittance for Basket `1sat`

This BRC defines the provenance remittance carried in BRC-37 customInstructions for outputs in the companion basket profile 1sat (BRC-147). It specifies an offline-verifiable package that binds a current 1-sat outpoint (tip) to a 1Sat Ordinals origin (BRC-159), using BEEF (or AtomicBEEF when it still covers the hop), BRC-159 sat ordering on every path hop, and a valid first ord envelope on the origin (BRC-160).

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BRC-1591Sat Ordinals: Single-satoshi Tokens and Origin Tracking

1Sat Ordinals treats a 1-satoshi output as a non-fungible token and tracks it through the chain.

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BRC-1601Sat Ordinals: Inscription Envelopes

This BRC defines how inscriptions attach content to a BRC-159 token: an ord envelope embedded in the locking script of a 1-satoshi output.

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BRC-161BSV-21 Fungible Tokens (JSON / Legacy)

This document specifies the legacy JSON wire encoding of BSV-21 fungible tokens: an ord inscription with content type application/bsv-20. Token balances live in UTXOs. Each token is identified by the outpoint of its deploy output.

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BRC-1621Color

1Color is a fungible token protocol for Bitcoin SV. Balances live in UTXOs. Each token is identified by the outpoint of its deploy output. Token data is a fixed script prefix of data pushes, readable and constructible in Bitcoin script without parsing JSON.

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BRC-163BSV-21 Basket Profile for BRC-46 / BRC-100

This BRC defines the application basket profile for BRC-161 BSV-21 fungible value outputs under BRC-46 / BRC-100. It reserves the basket name bsv21, specifies eligibility, documents tags for listOutputs filters, BRC-37 customInstructions for load-bearing token fields and derivation, and describes normative hold / list / transfer / import flows.

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BRC-165P1Sat Permission Scheme for Basket `1sat`

This BRC defines the P1Sat basket permission scheme for BRC-100 wallets: scheme id 1sat under BRC-99 / BRC-116.

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BRC-174Consensus-Unique Name Tokens: Identity Binding and Verified Resolution

Uniqueness is not free on Bitcoin: script validates transactions, not protocol semantics, so nothing inherently stops two parties from each broadcasting a valid claim to the same name.

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BRC-176BSV-21: Validity Proofs

This BRC defines an offline-verifiable packet that proves one or more transaction outputs are valid BSV-21 (BRC-161) or 1Color (BRC-162) token outputs.

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BRC-197Accumulating Right-of-Sale Listings and Purchase Orders

An active listing is a reusable Bitcoin UTXO. A buyer adds exactly one price increment and creates a recipient-bound purchase receipt. Anyone can withdraw whole revenue quanta to the committed recipients without the seller’s cooperation. The seller can split a listing or retire it early using a protected, publicly derived child signing key. After a committed block height, anyone can retire it and distribute its entire value. The identity root private key never signs a Bitcoin transaction or receives a payment.

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BRC-217Authenticated 1Sat Inscription

This BRC specifies, to the byte, a single transaction output that carries an inscription, stays spendable so the inscribed satoshi can be transferred, and binds the inscription to the identity that created it. It composes four things in one output script, in a fixed order: a standard spend condition (commonly a pay-to-public-key-hash lock), the BRC-160 ord inscription envelope, an optional metadata section, and an author-identity section that signs the output. The output is the single-satoshi token of BRC-159, and this document adds the authenticity that BRC-160 leaves to a separate specification. Two facts are fixed that an implementation gets wrong silently. First, the data that rides after the inscription MUST sit behind one bare OP_RETURN (0x6a), which leaves the spend condition’s result on the stack and keeps the satoshi spendable, and MUST NOT sit behind OP_FALSE OP_RETURN (0x00 0x6a), which strands the satoshi forever; the difference is one byte and does not fail visibly at creation. Second, the author-identity section is an Author Identity Protocol (AIP) section whose signing component and algorithm are ordered as the 1Sat Ordinals signing convention places them, which is the reverse of generic Bitcom AIP, and whose selector -1 signs the exact output-script bytes that precede the section. This BRC pins that order and selector, states the Bitcoin Signed Message preimage the signature covers, and gives canonical pass and fail hex vectors for a full locked, inscribed, metadata-bearing, signed output. Each vector’s signature was verified by public-key recovery, and the spendable and unspendable output forms were checked against a post-Genesis script interpreter.

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BRC-226Miner-Enforced Resale-Royalty Covenant Tokens (OP_PUSH_TX)

This BRC specifies a class of self-replicating covenant tokens whose spending rules are enforced by miners at consensus, not by any platform. Using OP_PUSH_TX transaction introspection, each token’s locking script forces the transaction that spends it to (a) re-create the token for its new holder and (b) pay fixed royalty/creator outputs to immutable addresses. A resale that omits, reorders, underpays, or redirects any required payout is simply an invalid transaction, so the resale terms are unstrippable and travel with the coin.

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BRC-251Bitcoin Native Tokens (BNT): Definition and Wallet Duties

A wallet balance does not show whether a token depends on anyone besides its holder. This document makes that dependency visible in the script.

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BRC-252Short Proofs for Bitcoin Native Tokens

A Bitcoin Native Token (BNT) recipient checks every hop back to the deploy (draft BRC-251, #320, test 2). Draft BRC-255 (#335) defines that walk and the proof package that carries it. The package grows with every trade. This document keeps it short however long an asset trades. The recipient still decides validity itself, from transactions named by transaction ID and proofs it checks.

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BRC-253Issuer-Permissioned Tokens (IPT): Countersigned Tokens and Items

Some assets get their value from their issuer: handles, stablecoins, tickets. The issuer needs to refuse a transfer or freeze a holder, and holders need to keep the asset when the issuer is gone. Art, collectables and open tokens need no third party. They are Bitcoin Native Tokens.

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BRC-254Market Offers and Direct Swaps for Wallet Assets

This document specifies how a wallet sells an asset it holds, on a public market or to one counterparty. The seller need not be online at the sale, and no index holds keys.

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BRC-255Bitcoin Native Tokens (BNT): Compact Format

This document is a compact output format for Bitcoin Native Tokens, both fungible tokens and one-of-a-kind items. A recipient checks every hop back to the deploy, so every output’s bytes are paid again in every later proof. This format keeps them small: a transfer with one input, a payment and change is 452 bytes, against 492 for the same transfer as a BRC-162 token with P2PKH (§12).

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BRC-370Sealed 1Sat Ordinal Reveal

This BRC specifies how the content of a 1Sat Ordinal is sealed as keyed content (BRC-369) inscribed on chain and later revealed, either to everyone or to one chosen recipient, without re-inscribing. A sealing party encrypts the content under a fresh BRC-369 content key and inscribes the ciphertext in the ordinary inscription envelope; the plaintext is never on chain. This BRC reuses BRC-369’s content key, its key commitment, and its local verification unchanged, and supplies what BRC-369 leaves open: an on-chain carrier (the ordinal’s own envelope rather than off-chain storage addressed by hash), a binding of the key to one ordinal by the hash of its inscription output script, and a public-reveal mode. Two reveal mechanisms are defined over that one sealed ordinal. The first is a public reveal, which BRC-369 does not define: an unspendable data output, under a dedicated tag, that publishes the content key together with the script-id binding and that ordinal’s genesis outpoint, so that any holder of the ciphertext confirms the key against the commitment and decrypts with no trusted indexer. The second is a targeted reveal: an off-chain, owner-signed grant that wraps the same key to a single recipient’s identity key with a fully specified public-key encryption scheme, the role BRC-369 gives its per-recipient release, so that only that recipient decrypts while the world still sees only ciphertext. The sealed field carries BRC-369’s commitment to the content key, and the grant signs that commitment and names its recipient, so one sealed ordinal has exactly one revealable content and one owner-chosen recipient per grant. Both reveals are irreversible once delivered, and both are kept out of any unrelated on-chain record feed by a reserved tag of their own. This document fixes the on-chain sealing format, the public-reveal output to the byte, the targeted-reveal grant and its signed range, the key wrap to the byte, the key-to-ordinal binding, and the verification each party performs, reusing BRC-369 for the content key and its commitment.

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Overlays

Standards for creating and interacting with overlay networks, and protocols for specific overlay networks:

BRCTitle
BRC-22Overlay Network Data Synchronization

This document proposes a solution for synchronizing data across UTXO-based overlay networks by specifying a mechanism for submitting transactions and receiving topic-specific admittance instructions. In current interoperable implementations, overlay services accept BEEF-formatted transaction submissions together with a set of topic names and return a per-topic result describing newly admitted outputs and retained historical inputs. This standard defines the parameters and processing steps needed to track topical UTXOs.

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BRC-23Confederacy Host Interconnect Protocol (CHIP)

We outline the Confederacy Host Interconnect Protocol (CHIP), a peer discovery mechanism for UTXO-based overlay networks. CHIP is an overlay network which tracks active network operators hosting specific topics, facilitating UTXO discovery, providing robust availability guarantees, thus enabling fault tolerance. This document specifies the format for CHIP tokens, their propagation across the network, and the process of using them to find and connect with hosts.

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BRC-24Overlay Network Lookup Services

This document proposes a solution for querying the state of UTXO-based overlay networks by specifying a lookup-service mechanism. In current interoperable implementations, clients send a { service, query } object to a /lookup endpoint and receive an output-list answer describing relevant outputs using BEEF-backed transaction data. This standard defines the parameters and processing steps needed to query for and access topical UTXOs.

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BRC-25Confederacy Lookup Availability Protocol (CLAP)

We specify the Confederacy Lookup Availability Protocol (CLAP), a protocol for advertising the availability of BRC-24 lookup services on overlay network nodes. CLAP is an extension of BRC-23 that focuses on advertising the availability of lookup services instead of topics. By enabling the discovery of lookup services provided by various network operators, CLAP facilitates efficient and decentralized access to relevant data. This document details the format for CLAP tokens, their propagation across the network, and the process of using them to find and connect with hosts offering lookup services.

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BRC-26Universal Hash Resolution Protocol
BRC-35Layered Key-Value Store for Wallets and Overlay Services

This document defines a layered key-value store standard for BSV systems that represent state as spendable PushDrop token outputs.

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BRC-64Overlay Network Transaction History Tracking

This document proposes a solution for tracking transaction histories within UTXO-based overlay networks by extending the BRC-22 submission result model to identify which spent topical coins should be retained for history and by extending BRC-24 lookup behavior to return BEEF that preserves source-transaction ancestry. This allows clients to traverse the lifecycle of topical outputs directly from returned transaction data. The older notion of extending BRC-36 JSON envelopes is now historical and is not the current interoperable mechanism.

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BRC-81Private Overlays with P2PKH Transactions

In BRC-22 overlay networks, various forms of state tracking for UTXOs can be incorporated. Servers can track UTXOs according to many criteria, enabling many use-cases. There is no fundamental requirement that a server relies on strictly on-chain data for these operations. In this document, we explore the use of off-chain secrets and offset values, enabling private overlay networks to be tracked among transactions that, on the surface, appear only to be normal P2PKH spends. Various models will be explored, from overlay network secrets to data linkages revealed off-chain. All of these methodologies rely on the isomorphic properties of the curve, enabling the owners of the UTXOs to retain spendability rights even when the P2PKH outputs also contain other information stored within offsets from the root key. This information is used to make on-chain record of private, off-chain data, which can later be revealed.

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BRC-87Standardized Naming Conventions for BRC-22 Topic Managers and BRC-24 Lookup Services

This document proposes standardized naming conventions for topic managers in BRC-22 and lookup services in BRC-24 to ensure clarity, interoperability, and uniformity across different implementations. The goal is to provide consistent and easily understandable names that facilitate efficient communication and integration between overlay network nodes and services within the BSV ecosystem.

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BRC-88Overlay Services Synchronization Architecture

This document outlines the Overlay Services Synchronization Architecture, detailing the Services Host Interconnect Protocol (SHIP) and Services Lookup Availability Protocol (SLAP). These protocols enable efficient peer discovery and data synchronization across UTXO-based overlay networks. This BRC defines the components, interactions, and responsibilities of nodes running these protocols to maintain reliable and up-to-date overlay services.

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BRC-101Diverse Facilitators and URL Protocols for SHIP and SLAP Overlay Advertisements
BRC-136Block-Anchored Overlay Synchronization via Block-Aligned Sparse Merkle Trees (BASM)

This BRC defines a lightweight, cryptographically strong synchronization layer for BSV overlay networks that provides per-block completeness guarantees for the subset of transactions admitted to a given topic.

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BRC-167Chunked, Hashed, Interleaved Resolution Protocol (CHIRP)

This document defines the Chunked, Hashed, Interleaved Resolution Protocol (CHIRP), an immutable Merkle-object layer above the Universal Hash Resolution Protocol (UHRP) defined by BRC-26. UHRP identifies and discovers a single byte string by its SHA-256 hash. CHIRP identifies an ordered byte stream by a small root node that commits to hashed data chunks and, when necessary, hashed branch nodes.

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BRC-178Race-Settled Collection Markets for Overlay Lookups and Message Boxes

This BRC specifies a client-judged payment market that lets a network of independent overlay hosts and message box servers compete to answer the same query. A client broadcasts an authenticated request, ranks responses by the time they actually arrive, and pays the fastest hosts that attest the same content hash. Payment is split across a configurable top-K set using square-root weights so that second- and later-place hosts still earn enough to stay viable, while first place still earns more than fifth. A possession threshold on the content hash makes isolated possession insufficient to collect: eligibility requires t distinct host identity keys attesting the same hash. Recipients need not hold BSV. The sender of a stored message MAY pre-fund a collection grant that the recipient spends at collect time. The same market applies to BRC-24 overlay lookups, BRC-33 message box collection, and other relay lookups whose result is a byte string that can be hashed.

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BRC-180Overlay Service Discovery at an Internet Domain

A domain declares the overlay services it hosts in a metanet.overlays object in its /manifest.json, mapping service names to the base URL that serves them.

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BRC-183A Framework for Strict and Federated Overlays

Overlay remains the general term for topic-oriented networks and services that interpret, track, exchange, and query Bitcoin transaction data under application-defined rules.

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BRC-193Incremental Lookup and Resumable Live Results
BRC-194Overlay Capabilities and Non-Final Proposal Sessions
BRC-195Private Overlay Data and Recoverable Paid Lookup
BRC-196STEAK with POTATOES
BRC-199SHIP and SLAP Root-Host Output Eviction Coordination
BRC-211Signed On-Chain Reachability Manifest

This BRC defines a reachability manifest: a record, signed by a service’s issuer key and published on the BSV chain, that lists the transports at which the service can be reached (an inscribed application shell, Tor onion services, clearnet mirrors, IP addresses, IPFS content, Nostr relays), each with a priority, under one sequence number. A client holds the issuer key as a constant compiled into its build, takes candidate manifests from any source, accepts only those whose ECDSA signature over a domain-separated canonical JSON encoding verifies under that key, keeps the one with the highest sequence number at or above its stored floor, and tries its endpoints in order. It can therefore still find the service after a domain suspension, a host seizure or an app-store removal. Presence on chain confers no trust, and the signature proves who listed the endpoints, not that the list is the newest or that each endpoint is still the service’s. Overlay discovery (BRC-88) takes over once a connection exists.

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BRC-257Proving Service for Bitcoin Native Tokens, 1Sat Ordinals and BSV-21

A Bitcoin Native Token (BNT) recipient checks the token’s history back to its deploy, and that history grows with every trade. A step proof of draft BRC-252 (#321) §4 is a trustless checkpoint. It stands in for the history behind a transaction, and the recipient checks it itself. Wallets pass step proofs to each other in the token package, and a recipient may refuse a transfer whose walk back to the newest proof is longer than its limit. Step proofs are for histories longer than that limit. A wallet checks a short history itself in milliseconds (11 ms for three hops on a laptop). Proving one transaction alone took about four minutes and 19 GB of memory on a laptop, so wallets check proofs and do not make them. A service proves many transactions in one batch, about 5 s each in a batch of 100. Checking a proof stays cheap at any depth.

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Payments

Protocols for exchanging payments in various contexts:

BRCTitle
BRC-27Direct Payment Protocol (DPP)

The Direct Payment Protocol (DPP) is a comprehensive standard for invoice-based peer-to-peer payments on the Bitcoin SV network, encompassing the evolution of BIP70 through BIP270 and its related invoicing standards, including BIP271, BIP272, BIP273, BIP274, BIP275, and BIP282. The DPP harmonizes extensions to these standards, allowing for various payment options and combinations, while maintaining a well-maintained and up-to-date source of information for developers and industry players. The protocol facilitates communication between a payment host (e.g., merchant, payment processor, recipient’s wallet) and sender (e.g., customer, acquaintance, IoT device) to enhance customer experience, simplify wallet infrastructure, enable advanced wallet features, and improve wallet security against payment process attacks.

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BRC-28Paymail Payment Destinations

We specify the widely-used protocols for exchanging payments between users of the Paymail system within the Bitcoin SV network. Paymail is a user-friendly alternative to traditional Bitcoin addresses, leveraging human-readable names at a domain, such as john.galt@gateway.cash. This standard aims to provide a clear and concise specification for wallet implementers to facilitate incoming and outgoing payments using Paymail addresses. BRC-28 encompasses the pre-existing payment destination and payment exchange protocols, ensuring compatibility and interoperability across Bitcoin SV wallet applications.

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BRC-29Simple Authenticated BSV P2PKH Payment Protocol

This BRC specifies a protocol for exchanging simple P2PKH payments between a sender and a recipient in a way that is SPV-compliant and cross-compatible. The protocol makes use of BRC-42 key derivation to derive public and private keys between users and BRC-62 / BRC-95 BEEF data to relay transaction validation information. Current wallet implementations use BRC-100 createAction and internalizeAction to construct and receive these payments.

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BRC-41PacketPay HTTP Payment Mechanism

This standard describes PacketPay, a mechanism for facilitating micropayments using Bitcoin SV within HTTP requests. It relies on the BRC-29 payment protocol for processing payments, and BRC-31 Authrite for authenticating communications between the API provider and consumer. PacketPay enables secure, per-request monetization of APIs, allowing API providers to charge consumers on a pay-per-use basis. This standard defines the required HTTP headers, the process of making and verifying payments, and the necessary steps to implement PacketPay in API interactions.

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BRC-54Hybrid Payment Mode for DPP

The core DPP (Direct Payment Protocol) has been defined by BRC-27, but it is non-functional without at least one mode to facilitate payments. We extend the core DPP by introducing the Hybrid Payment Mode. This flexible and open-ended payment mode facilitates payments with BSV as well as various token types, such as loyalty points and stable coins. The Hybrid Payment Mode allows a payment host to stipulate payment from a set of funding types created with AND and OR connections, enabling a wallet to choose the most suitable option based on user resources.

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BRC-55HTTPS Transport Mechanism for DPP

BRC-27 defines an abstract messaging protocol that facilitates payments on the Bitcoin SV network. This specification extends the protocol with the specifics required for a concrete HTTPS implementation that includes message size limits and HTTPS-specific implementation details.

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BRC-70Paymail BEEF Transaction

We specify a Paymail capability extension which supports the passing of BEEF Transactions between hosts. The procedure for service discovery and requesting outputs is not detailed, rather this specification contains only a recommendation to replace BRC-12 RawTx hex data with BRC-62 BEEF hex data.

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BRC-105HTTP Service Monetization Framework
BRC-118Multipart Body Transport for BRC-105 Payments
BRC-120x402 Stateless Settlement-Gated HTTP Protocol

This standard assigns a Bitcoin Request for Comments (BRC) designation to the x402 stateless settlement-gated HTTP protocol so that it can be indexed, cited, and implemented under a stable identifier (BRC-120). It defines BRC-120 compliance: implementations that claim this designation MUST satisfy the frozen x402 version 1.0 specification maintained in the merkleworks-x402-spec repository. This document establishes scope and mandatory conformance rules. It does not redefine wire formats, header payloads, or verification procedures; those remain solely in the canonical specification.

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BRC-121Simple 402 Payments

This BRC specifies a lightweight protocol for monetizing HTTP resources using the 402 Payment Required status code and a set of custom HTTP headers. A server advertises a price and its identity key in the 402 response. A client constructs a BRC-29 payment transaction, encodes it in BRC-95 BEEF format, and retransmits the original request with payment headers. The server validates the transaction, internalizes the payment via its wallet, and serves the protected resource. The protocol is stateless from the server’s perspective: each request is independently authorized by the presence or absence of valid payment headers.

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BRC-125PeerPay URI Scheme for BRC-29 Payments

This BRC defines the peerpay URI scheme, a compact, human-shareable encoding for initiating a BRC-29 peer-to-peer payment. The URI encodes the recipient’s identity key (a DER-encoded compressed secp256k1 public key) and an optional satoshi amount, enabling wallets, QR codes, NFC tags, and clickable links to trigger BRC-29 payments without requiring a Paymail address or an active HTTP endpoint.

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BRC-166P2PKH Payments for HTTP 402
BRC-1751Color Offline Peer-to-Peer Payments

This BRC specifies how one wallet pays 1Color (BRC-162) tokens to another wallet when either party, or both, may be offline. The payer hands the payee one payment bundle: a signed transaction, the data the payee needs to recognize its output, and enough evidence to show that every token the payer spends traces back to outputs an overlay has already admitted. The payee checks the bundle without any network access, credits the payment or holds it until missing evidence arrives, and settles it with the overlay later.

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BRC-228Unlinkable Payments under the Identity Paradigm

This BRC specifies a sender-side profile of BRC-29. It produces P2PKH payments that a recipient can internalize with existing BRC-100 wallets, while keeping the sender’s long-term identity key out of the remittance.

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BRC-235Paymail Public Profile Lookup

We specify two Paymail capabilities that bind a human-readable handle@domain to an identity key, in both directions. The forward capability, public profile lookup (0ace65da5987), takes a full or partial handle and returns matching public profiles. The reverse capability, public profile reverse lookup (43dcf83ddc5f), takes an identity key and returns its profile. Every profile is a self-signed BRC-52 certificate in which subject and certifier are both the holder’s identity key, so a client verifies what the host returns rather than trusting it. The identity key obtained is the recipient for BRC-29 payments; the reverse capability lets interfaces show alice@example.com where they would otherwise show 66 hex characters.

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BRC-256Cross-Chain Atomic Swaps Between Wallets

This document lets two BRC-100 wallets swap coins of two different chains, BSV and the chains of draft BRC-213, directly with each other. Nobody holds either side’s coins at any point. Either both get paid, or each takes its own coins back after a lock time. Neither wallet has to be online when the other acts.

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Peer-to-peer

Protocols for exchanging messages between peers, opening communication channels and authenticating peers:

BRCTitle
BRC-31Authrite Mutual Authentication

This specification defines Authrite, a system for the mutual authentication of two parties over a communications channel. It facilitates the exchange of BRC-52 identity certificates between users, allowing them to certify each other’s identities and share identity information selectively. Authrite leverages the BRC-42 Identity Keys of MetaNet Users and relies on BRC-43 Permissions and BRC-53 Certificate management functions to allow Users to control how identity information is shared. This specification defines the nonce exchanges, certificate and field exchange negotiation protocol, and message signing scheme for two-party Authrite communications channels.

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BRC-33PeerServ Message Relay Interface

This document introduces a message box architecture and relay interface to enable data exchange between two parties using a BRC-31 authenticated server. This system allows for message exchange and forwarding between parties who might be offline or unable to establish a direct peer-to-peer connection. While the use of a server as a go-between for peer-to-peer exchange is not novel, this system offers enough flexibility to support federation, removing the need for a single central server.

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BRC-34PeerServ Host Interconnect Protocol

This document outlines the PeerServ Host Interconnect Protocol (PHIP), a peer discovery mechanism specifically designed for the PeerServ message relay system. Analogous to the scalability and resiliency enabled by BRC-23 CHIP (Confederacy Host Interconnect Protocol) for overlay networks, PHIP allows PeerServ instances to discover and connect with other active instances where a particular user receives messages, thus enabling robust and efficient message delivery across these instances. It also defines a mechanism for instances to prove the authenticity of the original message sender to one another using BRC-69 key linkage information.

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BRC-52Identity Certificates

This specification defines identity certificates for BRC-100 wallets and peer-to-peer authentication systems. A certificate binds an identity key to encrypted certified fields under a certifier signature, while allowing the holder to reveal selected fields to selected verifiers. The specification covers the core certificate JSON and binary formats, the signed binary preimage, certificate field encryption, master keyrings, verifier keyrings, and revocation outpoints.

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BRC-63Genealogical Identity Protocol

The Genealogical Identity Protocol (GIP) represents an innovative leap in identity verification within the Bitcoin ecosystem. Merging genealogical data in GEDCOM files with advanced cryptographic techniques, the GIP creates an immutable and secure identity system. This aligns seamlessly with Dan Roble’s Innovation Bank proposal and integrates with global identity protocols, thereby enhancing interoperability.

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BRC-68Publishing Trust Anchor Details at an Internet Domain

This document outlines a protocol that allows an entity to publish trust anchor details, including a public key, at a location on the internet. The information is stored in the /manifest.json file of the domain under the metanet.trust key. This approach provides a user-friendly method for individuals to easily retrieve a trusted entity’s public key by entering a known domain name.

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BRC-77Message Signature Creation and Verification

This document defines a protocol for creating and verifying digital message signatures in the Bitcoin ecosystem. It leverages the BRC-42 key derivation and BRC-43 invoice numbers to facilitate privately-verifiable signatures, increasing security and privacy in Bitcoin message interactions.

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BRC-78Serialization Format for Portable Encrypted Messages

This document describes a protocol for a portable message encryption and description scheme. It follows the BRC-42 key derivation and BRC-43 invoice number standards to protect the confidentiality of message content, without requiring the added complexity of agreeing on a specific BRC-43 protocol for the parties to use.

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BRC-82Defining a Scalable IPv6 Multicast Protocol for Blockchain Transaction Broadcast and Update Delivery

This document builds upon the insights of BRC-80 and proposes a scalable, efficient IPv6 multicast protocol specifically designed for the broadcast of blockchain transactions and the delivery of transaction status updates, such as merkle proofs and double-spend attempt notifications. Recognizing the limitations of existing IPv6 multicast protocols, including Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD), this protocol addresses the needs for massive scalability, efficient data delivery, and economic sustainability required by modern blockchain networks. This protocol employs a layered approach using MLDv2 at the edges, multicast Border Gateway Protocol (mBGP) at the core, and introduces an intermediate aggregation/summarization layer to ensure global scalability and efficiency.

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BRC-85Proven Identity Key Exchange (PIKE)

Allowing humans to securely exchange public keys using web apis and an off channel sharing of TOTPs.

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BRC-103Peer-to-Peer Mutual Authentication and Certificate Exchange Protocol
BRC-104HTTP Transport for BRC-103 Mutual Authentication
BRC-138Single-Use Signed Proofs for Request Authentication

This standard defines a lightweight mechanism for a server to authenticate that a request was made by the holder of a wallet identity key, login being the most common example, but any action applies, in a single request, without a prior challenge round-trip and without a full mutual-authentication session.

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BRC-141Fountain-Coded Air-Gap Transport for Arbitrary Payloads

This standard defines a payload-agnostic, one-directional optical transport that carries an arbitrary byte string across an air gap as a sequence of QR codes. Each QR decodes to a single US-ASCII string beginning with the fixed prefix air-gap:, followed by unpadded URL-safe base64 of a versioned binary header and one fixed-size block. Parts are produced by a systematic Luby-transform fountain: the first K sequence numbers are the source blocks themselves, and later sequence numbers are deterministic XOR mixtures of those blocks, selected by an exactly specified integer-arithmetic ideal-soliton sampler so every language reproduces identical parts bit for bit. A receiver assembles the payload from distinct parts in any order, with duplicates tolerated, so a missed camera frame does not force a full animation cycle of waiting; recovery from K + ε distinct parts is highly probable but not guaranteed, and a sender that loops its sequence makes eventual recovery certain. An 8-byte session identity in every header lets a receiver lock onto one sender and ignore stray frames from another. Integrity is checked with the IEEE CRC-32 of the complete payload, carried in every part header and re-verified before bytes are emitted. The scheme is deliberately independent of payment, signing, or wallet semantics: applications supply and interpret the payload. Symbol rendering, camera capture, and animation cadence are out of scope.

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BRC-169Universal Handle Addressing and Resolution for the Metanet

This document specifies a universal addressing scheme for the Metanet, in which every person, organisation, machine, and agent is reachable by a human-readable handle of the form @handle@ecosystem, regardless of which wallet ecosystem they belong to.

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BRC-182Pairwise Authentication

A BRC-100 (Unified, Vendor-Neutral, Unchanging, and Open BSV Blockchain Standard Wallet-to-Application Interface) wallet authenticates to every site with the same identity key, its master public key. Any two sites that hold it can tell they have the same user, and the user cannot take it back or clear it.

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BRC-200Operating Practices for Identity Certifiers

This specification defines operating practices for issuers of BRC-52 identity certificates. It requires an attributable, versioned statement of what an issuer certifies, how evidence is checked, how issuance is authorized, how keys and revocation are managed, and how errors and incidents are handled. It preserves the BRC-52 certificate format, BRC-100 wallet interface, and the relying user’s choice of certifiers. Certificate-type specifications supply the meanings and evidence requirements of particular claims; these practices supply their common operational foundation.

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BRC-201Social Account Certificate Types and Issuance Profile

This specification documents the existing Email, X, and Discord certificate types used by SocialCert and recognized by BSV identity clients. It specifies their exact identifiers, case-sensitive field names, plaintext meanings, issuer evidence requirements, and limits on reliance. These types use the encrypted certificate primitives of BRC-52 and the acquisition and selective disclosure methods of BRC-100. Issuance establishes an issuer’s observation of an external account association with a subject key; public discovery remains a separate choice made by the subject.

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BRC-202Identity-Key Decentralized Identifiers

This specification defines a reversible did:key representation of a BRC identity key. It specifies identifier encoding, DID document construction, resolution, verification relationships, and the limits of key continuity. It provides an identifier foundation for BRC certificates and applications without replacing BRC-52 certificates, BRC-100 wallet operations, BRC-103 authentication, or user-selected trust.

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BRC-203BRC-52 Encrypted Certificate Profile for Verifiable Credential Interoperability

This specification defines a deterministic credential view and an explicit verification envelope for existing BRC-52 certificates. The original certifier signature and encrypted fields remain unchanged. Issuer, subject, credential type, selective disclosure, and status are expressed using W3C Verifiable Credential concepts, while certificate signature verification, field encryption, verifier keyrings, and outpoint revocation retain their BRC semantics.

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BRC-225Animated-QR Air-Gap Transport for Arbitrary Payloads (TKQR1)

TKQR1 is a text framing that carries an arbitrary byte string across an optical air gap as a sequence of QR codes (“animated QR”), then reassembles it on the far side with integrity and set-consistency checks. Each frame is a single line of US-ASCII: a fixed prefix, a 64-bit truncated SHA-256 tag of the whole payload, a zero-based sequence number, a frame total, and a URL-safe base64 slice of the raw payload. Every frame of one payload carries the same payload tag, so a collector deterministically rejects frames that belong to a different or stale stream (mixed-set detection), refuses to emit until all frames are present, and re-verifies the full payload hash before returning bytes. The scheme is deliberately minimal (fixed-order indexed frames, no fountain code, no CBOR) so it can be implemented identically in two languages and validated byte-for-byte against a shared vector set. It is payload-agnostic: authenticity and confidentiality are the responsibility of the enclosed payload, not the transport.

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BRC-231Binary Encoding for the Message Relay Interface

An alternative wire format for the BRC-33 message relay interface: the same requests and responses as DAG-CBOR instead of JSON, with the message body and identity keys as byte strings.

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BRC-232Unsolicited Transaction Delivery to a BRC-169 Mailbox

This specification privately delivers a transaction, its existing wallet receipt instructions and its protected lifecycle through a BRC-169 mailbox. The receiving Conforming Application owns acceptance and authorized publication/registration; the wallet independently validates receipt. Delivery, wallet acceptance, overlay admission and Bitcoin confirmation are distinct facts.

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BRC-246Session Upgrade: BRC-33 Messages over WebRTPay

This BRC lets two online wallets, or two installs of one account, send BRC-33 messagebox traffic over a direct WebRTC data channel. It uses the connection that webrtpay/1 ([WebRTPay protocol reference][webrtpay]) defines for direct payments, unchanged: the same signalling envelopes, presence check, channel framing and identity handshake. It adds only what messages need: a messages purpose, device addressing for installs that share an identity key, and two session messages, msg and ack.

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BRC-247Identity-Key Issuer Attestation

This BRC defines how a BRC-100 wallet attests 1Sat inscriptions and BRC-162 token deploys with its identity key, whichever wallet profile holds the token (1Color, BRC-207; P2P-FT, BRC-251). The issuance carries a SIGMA signature, made under BRC-77 by the issuing account’s identity key and bound to one of the transaction’s inputs. A holder reads the issuer from the signature itself. JSON token deploys (BRC-161) can carry the same stamp. Names and images for an identity key, and optional BAP profiles linked to it, are BRC-248.

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BRC-248Offline Issuer Identity Packages

BRC-247 stamps a 1Sat or 1Color issuance with the issuer’s BRC-100 identity key. This BRC lets a holder turn that identity key into a name and an image from data it already holds, without querying an indexer, an overlay or a web server at display time.

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BRC-369Keyed Content and Conditional Key Release

This document specifies how content is encrypted once, published where anyone can fetch it, and opened only by parties who satisfy a stated condition. Four properties follow, and each is unavailable to a paywall that decides what to render.

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Key derivation

Methods for deriving child keys from parent keys:

BRCTitle
BRC-32BIP32 Key Derivation Scheme

This technical standard describes a method for hierarchical key derivation called BIP32. Hierarchical key derivation enables the generation of a large number of public-private key pairs from a single master seed, and the ability to derive child keys from parent keys in a deterministic manner. BIP32 is a widely used standard in various fields such as wallets, but has various limitations and drawbacks that should be considered carefully before further adoption.

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BRC-42BSV Key Derivation Scheme (BKDS)

This technical standard defines a key derivation method that allows two parties to derive multiple keys for each other in an open-ended manner. The method employs invoice numbers as a simple way for multiple keys to be derived. A sender can derive a public key for a recipient without knowing the recipient’s corresponding private key, and the recipient can later use the sender’s public key and the same invoice number to derive a corresponding private key. The method removes the limit of 4 billion keys per child that is present in BIP32, improves the privacy of the involved parties by employing ECDH shared secrets, and enables an open-ended invoice numbering scheme for key derivation that can be further standardized for specific use-cases. The method can be used for private invoicing, digital signatures, symmetric cryptography, and other applications in Bitcoin and CBDC ecosystems.

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BRC-43Security Levels, Protocol IDs, Key IDs and Counterparties

We propose a standard format for invoice numbers that enables secure and permissioned access to a set of restricted key derivation universes within the context of BRC-42 derivation. The format defines a string that includes the security level, protocol ID, and key ID separated by hyphens. Security level 0 implies no permissions, level 1 grants permissions to all key IDs and all counterparties for the given protocol ID, and level 2 grants permissions only to a particular counterparty. The standard aims to enable the creation of protocols that can request permission to access data controlled by a user in a secure and standardized way.

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BRC-44Admin-reserved and Prohibited Key Derivation Protocols

We define a set of reserved protocol namespaces that can be employed by clients utilizing the BRC-43 invoice numbering scheme to be set aside for administrative and internal use by the client software itself. This enables client software to manage its own internal state without the risk that application software will utilize the same internal protocols.

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BRC-69Revealing Key Linkages

This BRC defines two methods for revealing key linkages under the BRC-42 key derivation scheme and BRC-43. Method 1 reveals the root ECDH shared point between two counterparties, enabling linkage across their derivation universe and calculation of their BRC-2 encryption keys for known derivation labels. Method 2 reveals a specific child-key offset rather than the root shared point. These methods support BRC-3 signature verification and transaction auditing, with different confidentiality boundaries. Neither method is a blanket guarantee that encrypted data remains confidential after a disclosure. Correctness of linkage claims is a separate concern addressed by BRC-93 and, for Method 1, BRC-94.

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BRC-72Protecting BRC-69 Key Linkage Information in Transit

This BRC outlines additional security measures for the protection and controlled revelation of key linkage information as defined in BRC-69. This standard describes an approach for encrypting this sensitive data during communication, according to BRC-2. The intent is to ensure that only approved parties are capable of decrypting and accessing this information, thereby maintaining privacy and security.

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BRC-75Mnemonic For Master Private Key

This is a simple extension of the widely used BIP39 Mnemonic seed phrase scheme where 12 to 24 words are used to encode entropy which is then used to derive an extended private key for use with the BRC-32 derivation scheme.

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BRC-84Linked Key Derivation Scheme

The Linked Key Derivation Scheme builds on and extends the “type 42” key derivation method. This scheme allows public key derivation using only the public keys of both parties, maintaining the flexibility and unlimited key derivation of type 42. It aims to enable non-custodial wallets to derive public keys from a master public key without private key access, while only the master private key owner can derive the corresponding private key.

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BRC-86Bidirectionally Authenticated Derivation of Privacy Restricted Type 42 Keys

Sometimes, there is a need for a third party to validate the linkage and key derivation process between two transacting parties. Type-42 derivation enables the private use of child keys between the parties based on an invoice number, but does not allow for third-party servers to verify the linkage of the keys. Proposals like BRC-84 describe ways to enable third-party verification while keeping the sender’s key linked to the derivation process, but lack a means of sender authentication. By their nature, privacy is lacking in all of thes proposals, but more can be done to preserve it. When Bitcoin is not exchanged in a peer-to-peer manner, this specification outlines the most robust approach to Bidirectionally Authenticated Derivation with Privacy Restrictions (BAD Privacy).

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BRC-93Limitations of BRC-69 Key Linkage Revelation

This BRC identifies and summarizes the key limitations of BRC-69 key linkage revelation. The primary issues are centered around the inability of verifiers to independently verify the accuracy and correctness of the revealed key linkage information without access to private keys. Specifically, in Method 1, there is no way for the verifier to confirm the shared secret between the prover and their counterparty, and in Method 2, verifiers cannot ascertain the correctness of the specific key linkage (protocol ID and key ID). These issues present significant trust and security concerns, limiting the effectiveness of BRC-69 in its current form.

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BRC-94Verifiable Revelation of Shared Secrets Using Schnorr Protocol

This BRC presents a solution to the limitations identified in BRC-93 concerning Method 1 of BRC-69 key linkage revelation. The method utilizes a Schnorr-based zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) scheme to enable provers to reveal a shared secret between their identity key and a counterparty’s key while allowing verifiers to independently confirm its validity without accessing private keys. This approach ensures trustless verification of shared secrets, enhancing the security and practical utility of key linkage revelations in privacy-preserving systems.

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BRC-140Threshold Key Sharing and Backup via Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme

This standard defines a method for splitting a secp256k1 private key into m shares such that any n of those shares (where 2 ≤ n ≤ m) can reconstruct the original key, while any fewer than n shares reveal nothing about it. The scheme is an application of Shamir’s Secret Sharing over the secp256k1 prime field, augmented with a cryptographically secure, non-deterministic share-coordinate generation procedure and a short integrity tag. A canonical textual (“backup”) serialization is specified so that individual shares can be written down, stored offline, and later recombined. This codifies the toKeyShares / fromKeyShares and toBackupShares / fromBackupShares methods of the PrivateKey class in the BSV TypeScript SDK.

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BRC-157Entropy-Rooted Backup and Recovery with Mnemonics and Backup Shares

This standard defines a unified backup and recovery scheme in which entropy, not a private key and not a mnemonic phrase, is the fundamental object being backed up. A 32-byte entropy value is represented as a secp256k1 private key so that it can be split into BRC-140 backup shares, and simultaneously encoded as a BIP-39 mnemonic sentence so that it can be written down as words. Either backup artifact, a quorum of shares, or the mnemonic, recovers the identical entropy, from which a canonical BIP-32 derivation produces the wallet’s root key (the private counterparty to the BRC-100 identity key) and any number of additional profile keys. This makes the two most widely deployed backup methods interchangeable rather than mutually exclusive, and codifies the toEntropy() / fromEntropy() methods of the Mnemonic class together with the toBackupShares() / fromBackupShares() methods of the PrivateKey class in the BSV TypeScript SDK.

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Outpoints

Standards for representing, synchronizing and storing transaction outpoints:

BRCTitle
BRC-36Format for Bitcoin Outpoints

This document specifies the canonical portable format for representing a Bitcoin outpoint together with the minimum data required for interoperable validation and use. The format is intentionally narrow: it standardizes the identity of the output, its value, its optional locking script, and the transaction-validity payload required to verify the creating transaction. This specification aligns with the output model used by BRC-100 and current Wallet Toolbox implementations.

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BRC-37Basket and Custom Instructions Extension for Bitcoin Outpoints

This document defines a minimal extension to BRC-36 for associating a Bitcoin outpoint with a wallet basket and, optionally, with custom instructions whose meaning is defined by that basket. The purpose of this extension is to support interoperable wallet-managed output organization without standardizing wallet-internal classification systems or forcing a universal instruction schema.

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BRC-38User Wallet Data Format

This specification defines a canonical, complete, portable file format for exporting Wallet Toolbox data for a single user as one blob.

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BRC-39User Wallet Data Format Encryption Extension

This specification defines the canonical encrypted wrapper for BRC-38 user wallet data exports.

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BRC-40User Wallet Data Synchronization

This specification defines an interoperable synchronization protocol for user wallet data between wallet storage providers. It standardizes the chunked, resumable sync model implemented by Wallet Toolbox so independent storage backends can exchange wallet state without proprietary adapters.

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Opinions

Opinions that are not a specific technical standard or protocol, but are worth keeping and discussing:

BRCTitle
BRC-49Users should never see an address

Addresses should have been a temporary measure for Bitcoin, whether the original Bitcoin SV or the forked off Bitcoin Core. Something that bridges the gap between the initial release and a user friendly next step. Unfortunately, for lack of any better idea they were adopted as a central feature and canonised alongside a limited set of standard scripts. Worse still, they were intended to be phased out but the replacement of Paymail, a flawed system that never met it is promise and is inherently insecure and broken.

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BRC-51List of user experiences

This document is a curated set of relevant and high level user experiences to aid as a reference for developers.

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BRC-57Legitimate Uses for mAPI

The mAPI specifications have gained a certain level of traction in the Bitcoin SV ecosystem over the preceding years, while also attracting their fair share of controversy and criticism. Certain mAPI use-cases, such as those that facilitate one-on-one relationships between miners and individual customers, are not in keeping with Section 5 of the Bitcoin whitepaper (“transactions are broadcast to all nodes”). However, other uses of mAPI including merkle proof notification, signed transaction endorsements from miner ID public keys, and double spend notifications are legitimate and must be part of any suitable replacement.

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BRC-59Security and Scalability Benefits of UTXO-based Overlay Networks

Various methods exist for keeping track of systems that derive their state from the Bitcoin network. Some architectures require all parties to have awareness of all transactions to prevent divergence in their computed view of the state. This leads to the need for trust in centralized indexing systems, as it is not feasible for end-users to be aware of all transactions at scale. This BRC argues that UTXO-based overlay networks offer a more secure and scalable approach to managing these states.

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BRC-80Improving on MLD for BSV Multicast Services

MLD (Multicast Listener Discovery) for IPv6 provides a way for a host to indicate to an upstream router that it is interested in receiving multicast traffic from a particular group. While this is useful in some cases (such as when miners in Bitcoin want to propagate blocks and subtrees to one another efficiently), it does not solve every use-case. This document will explore the limitations of existing IPv6 multicast protocols like MLD, both with respect to the broadcast of transactions to miners and overlays, as well as the acquisition of transaction status updates like merkle proofs or double-spend attempt notifications from network operators. We will briefly discuss the economic incentives of existing multicast protocols, how they could be improved with Bitcoin, and we will conclude by defining a set of general requirements and constraints that a potential new, Bitcoin-oriented IPv6 multicast protocol ought to follow.

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BRC-89Web 3.0 Standard (at a high level)

This BRC defines a high-level, high-level standard for Web 3.0, defining the integration of blockchain technology, federated overlay networks, digital wallets, and enhanced browser functionalities to enable a decentralized and serverless web experience. This evolves the current web standards to facilitate content and applications that are fully powered by blockchain, allowing users to interact and manage their identities, assets, and cryptographic keys securely and independently.

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BRC-90Thoughts on the Mandala Network
BRC-91Outputs, Overlays, and Scripts in the Mandala Network

The Mandala Network’s architecture, with its three primary layers, Transaction Processors, Overlay Services, and Transacting Parties, forms a robust framework for managing blockchain transactions. Building upon this foundation, we delve deeper into the concepts of outputs, overlays, and scripts, exploring how they interact within the network to enable a more flexible and scalable blockchain ecosystem.

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BRC-110Zero-Friction, Mobile-First Onboarding for MetaNet-Enabled Apps

A zero-friction onboarding protocol optimized for mobile-first metanet enabled user experiences. Temporary key generation enables instant access without sign-up; standardized UI components facilitate seamless export of keys and cross-app communication while preserving usability across devices. Secondly it mandates clear contextual communication of the benefits of uniquely blockchain enabled features, so users understand why persistence matters at the right moments during their learning curve.

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BRC-137Device-Aware Wallet Onboarding and Fallback Login for BRC-100 Applications

This document specifies a standardized sign-in experience for applications built on the BRC-100 wallet-to-application interface. It defines how an application SHOULD greet an arriving user with a single, coherent login surface organized into four named buckets, Magic Link, Social Login, Web3 Login (multi-chain wallets via WalletConnect plus BSV wallets such as HandCash), and Metanet Login (verified self-custody on BRC-100), so that the user can (a) sign in via whichever method they already trust, (b) be guided, if they choose, to install the best BRC-100 wallet for their specific operating system in as few steps as possible, and (c) later migrate any non-Metanet account to Metanet without data loss when self-custody becomes valuable to them.

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BRC-151BRC-100 Risk Assessment and Best Integration Practices
BRC-152Best Practices for Regulated Tokens in a BRC-100 Ecosystem
BRC-186Thoughts on UTXO-Driven Applications and Private Overlays
BRC-187Thoughts on Declarative Stewardship
BRC-191Thoughts on Identity, Privacy and Recovery on the Metanet
BRC-234A Shared Schedule for Reducing Free Blockchain Index Coverage

This BRC proposes a shared schedule for reducing the transaction, address and script-based data that participating BSV Mainnet indexers guarantee to provide free of charge. Providers may retain complete indexes and offer broader free or paid access. Transaction validity and ownership remain unchanged.

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State machines

Methods for implementing state machines and event chains at scale on the network:

BRCTitle
BRC-60Simplifying State Machine Event Chains in Bitcoin
BRC-171Fixed-Width State in a Covenant's Own Locking Script

This standard defines how a covenant carries mutable state inside its own locking script, as a run of fixed-width data pushes, such that the state can be located, read and rewritten at constant byte offsets, by the covenant itself, and by any third party holding only the script.

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BRC-172Giving an AI Agent Control of a Delivery Vehicle Without Giving It a Wallet

An agent that spends on Bitcoin is normally given a wallet, which is to say a key, and a key is unbounded capability: it signs anything, for whoever holds it. Funding it lightly bounds the amount at risk without bounding the behaviour.

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Propose a BRC

To propose a new BRC, fork the BRCs repository, write a Markdown file from the EXAMPLE.md template, and open a pull request so others can review and discuss it.

To discuss an existing BRC, open an issue that links to its file. A substantial revision of a standard goes into a new BRC that extends or revises the old one, so implementations that follow the old one keep working.

To learn more about standards on the BSV blockchain, review these articles: